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Beyond Sacrificial Harm: A Two-Dimensional Model of
Utilitarian Psychology
Guy Kahane, Jim A. C. Everett, Brian D. Earp, Lucius Caviola, Nadira S. Faber, Molly J. Crockett,
and Julian Savulescu
University of Oxford
Recent research has relied on trolley-type sacrificial moral dilemmas to study utilitarian versus nonutili-
tarian modes of moral decision-making. This research has generated important insights into people’s
attitudes toward instrumental harm—that is, the sacrifice of an individual to save a greater number. But
this approach also has serious limitations. Most notably, it ignores the positive, altruistic core of
utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-being of everyone, whether near
or far. Here, we develop, refine, and validate a new scale—the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale—to dissociate
individual differences in the ‘negative’ (permissive attitude toward instrumental harm) and ‘positive’
(impartial concern for the greater good) dimensions of utilitarian thinking as manifested in the general
population. We show that these are two independent dimensions of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay
population, each exhibiting a distinct psychological profile. Empathic concern, identification with the
whole of humanity, and concern for future generations were positively associated with impartial
beneficence but negatively associated with instrumental harm; and although instrumental harm was
associated with subclinical psychopathy, impartial beneficence was associated with higher religiosity.
Importantly, although these two dimensions were independent in the lay population, they were closely
associated in a sample of moral philosophers. Acknowledging this dissociation between the instrumental
harm and impartial beneficence components of utilitarian thinking in ordinary people can clarify existing
debates about the nature of moral psychology and its relation to moral philosophy as well as generate
fruitful avenues for further research.
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According to classical utilitarianism, we should always act in
the way that would maximize aggregate well-being. Since its
introduction in the 18th century by the philosopher Jeremy
Bentham, this simple idea has been massively influential—and
massively controversial. Modern-day secular morality can be
seen as the gradual expansion of our circle of moral concern
from those who are emotionally close, physically near, or
similar to us, to cover the whole of humanity, and even all
sentient life (Singer, 1981; see also Pinker, 2011). Utilitarians
like Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, in our time, Peter Singer,
have played a pivotal role in this process, and in progressive
causes more generally. They have been leading figures in the
fights against sexism, racism, and ‘speciesism;’ influential sup-
porters of political and sexual liberty; and key actors in attempts
to eradicate poverty in developing countries as well as to
encourage more permissive attitudes to prenatal screening,
abortion, and euthanasia within our own societies (Bentham,
1789/1983; Mill, 1863; Singer, 2011). Yet utilitarians have
never constituted more than a tiny minority, and utilitarianism
has always faced fierce resistance. Pope John Paul II famously
wrote: “Utilitarianism is a civilization of production and of use,
a civilization of ‘things’ and not of ‘persons,’ a civilization in
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which persons are used in the same way as things are used”
(John Paul II, 1995). But it is not only defenders of traditional
morality who reject utilitarianism; prominent progressive think-
ers have criticized utilitarianism in similar terms (Rawls, 1971;
Williams, 1973), and many continue to angrily protest the views
of utilitarians such as Singer (Schaler, 2009). Clearly, utilitar-
ianism is a distinctive, influential, and controversial ethical
view.
Given the influential but controversial reach of utilitarianism
in ethics and society, questions about the psychological basis of
utilitarian moral thinking—and why some people are so at-
tracted to it while others are so repelled— have been of con-
siderable interest to philosophers and psychologists alike. Util-
itarians have often answered such questions by appealing to a
contrast between cool logic and misguided intuitions and emo-
tions. They argue that common moral views have their source in
gut reactions and intuitions shaped by discredited religious views or
evolutionary pressures, and that careful reflection should lead us to
abandon these views and endorse utilitarianism, a more logical view
based in rational reflection (Singer, 2005). Recognizing that this
notion is, in part, a testable hypothesis about human moral psychol-
ogy, some advocates of utilitarianism have generated an influential
body of empirical research that has by and large seemed to confirm it.
The main approach in this research has been to study re-
sponses to ‘sacrificial’ moral dilemmas (such as the famous
‘trolley’ scenario and its various permutations; see Foot, 1967)
which present a choice between sacrificing one innocent person
to save a greater number of people, or doing nothing and letting
them die. In analyzing these responses and relating them to
other variables, such as individual difference scores on person-
ality measures or patterns of brain activity, researchers have
tried to uncover the psychological and even neural underpin-
nings of the dispute between utilitarians and their opponents—
such as defenders of deontological, rights-based views of the
kind associated with Immanuel Kant.
In keeping with the ‘cool logic’ versus ‘misguided emotions’
framework, these researchers have made heavy use of a dual-
process approach to understanding human cognition. Dual pro-
cess models conceptualize cognition as resulting from the com-
petition between quick, intuitive, and automatic processes, and
slow, deliberative, and controlled processes (e.g., Bargh &
Chartrand, 1999; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Shiffrin & Schneider,
1977). Running with this idea, influential research by Greene
and colleagues has applied a dual process lens to our moral
judgments to suggest that while deontological judgments (re-
fusing to sacrifice the one) are based in immediate intuition and
emotional gutreactions, utilitarian judgments (sacrificing one to
save a greater number) are uniquely attributable to effortful
reasoning (Greene, 2007; Paxton, Bruni, & Greene, 2014). It
has also been suggested that these opposing utilitarian and
deontological forms of decision-making are based in distinct
neural systems (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen,
2004).
Despite an abundance of early findings in support of
Greene’s account, more recent research has yielded results that
are more difficult to square with its— ultimately flattering—
picture of utilitarian thinking. For example, multiple studies
have reported an association between ‘utilitarian’ responses to
sacrificial dilemmas and psychopathy and, more generally, ag-
gressive and antisocial tendencies including reduced concern
about harm to others (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Glenn, Koleva,
Iyer, Graham, & Ditto, 2010; Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, &
Savulescu, 2015; Wiech et al., 2013). These findings are puz-
zling. Utilitarians are supposed to care about the good of all
sentient beings; psychopaths notoriously care only about their
own good. So why is psychopathy one of the traits most
consistently associated with what are supposed to be paradigm
cases of utilitarian judgment?
The answer to this puzzle may be found by way of illustra-
tion. In March 2017, disability activists outraged by Peter
Singer’s support for the infanticide of severely disabled babies
prevented him from speaking (via an Internet link) at an event
organized by the Effective Altruism Club of Victoria University
in Canada—a club whose founding, in turn, was inspired by
Singer’s advocacy of self-sacrifice in the name of charity
(Singer, 2015). This incident—and the two ‘sides’ of Singer’s
views attracting both censure and praise— offers the beginnings
of an answer to our question by showing two distinct ways in
which utilitarianism radically departs from commonsense mo-
rality.
The first way utilitarianism departs from such commonsense
morality is that it places no constraints whatsoever on the maxi-
mization of aggregate well-being. If killing a severely disabled
child would lead to more good overall—as Singer believes is at
least sometimes the case—then utilitarianism, in stark contrast to
commonsense morality, requires that the child be killed. This
explains the angry protests at Singer’s talk. But this requirement is
just one aspect of utilitarianism: specifically, it is the negative
dimension according to which we are permitted (and even re-
quired) to instrumentally use, severely harm, or even kill innocent
people to promote the greater good. We call this dimension ‘in-
strumental harm.’
There is also a positive dimension to utilitarianism, and this
dimension, too, departs from commonsense morality. Recall
that utilitarianism requires us to maximize, not our own pref-
erences or well-being—not even that of those near or dear to us,
or of our compatriots— but the well-being of all sentient beings
on the planet, and to do so in such a way that “[e]ach is to count
for one and none for more than one” (Bentham, 1789/1983).
This dimension explains why utilitarianism is sometimes de-
scribed as a form of universal or impartial beneficence (which
is what we shall call this positive dimension). For people in
affluent countries, the demand to impartially maximize welfare
is likely to require significant self-sacrifice—for example, giv-
ing much of our income to charity. And although many find this
level of sacrifice far too demanding (Cullity, 2006), this impar-
tial ideal has inspired a global movement of ‘effective altruists,’
including those in attendance at Singer’s event at Victoria
University (MacAskill, 2015; Singer, 2015).
Now we can resolve the puzzle. The sacrificial dilemmas
paradigm, we claim, has yielded such strange and even contra-
dictory findings because it focuses almost exclusively on the
negative side of utilitarian decision-making. So, while psycho-
paths may be more willing to push someone off a footbridge to
save five others (or be less shocked by support for infanticide or
euthanasia), it would be surprising if these same psychopaths
signed up to join an Effective Altruism Club or showed care for
the plight of strangers in the developing world. In other words,
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the sacrificial dilemmas paradigm ignores or downplays the
positive, impartial and altruistic core of a utilitarian approach to
ethics. Accordingly, over a decade of research employing sac-
rificial dilemmas to study ‘utilitarian’ thinking has shed light
only or primarily on instrumental harm: the conditions under
which people find it acceptable to cause harm for a greater
good. Such dilemmas, however, tell us little about the sources
of impartial concern for the greater good, despite the fact that
this positive, all-encompassing altruistic aim is at the very heart
of a utilitarian approach. In short, recent research has told only
half of the story about the psychology of utilitarianism. And
because impartial beneficence is the philosophical core of util-
itarian thought—whereas acceptance of instrumental harm is
one implication of that central core, when it is endorsed without
qualification—it has arguably focused on the less important
half.
Our paper has three aims. First, we will propose a new
conceptual framework for thinking about the psychology of
utilitarian tendencies in the lay population. We hope that this
framework will also serve as a general model for thinking about
the relationship between the explicit ethical theories debated by
philosophers and the pretheoretical moral decision-making of
ordinary people. Second, using this framework, we will outline
a new approach for studying individual differences in proto-
utilitarian tendencies. We will introduce and validate a new
scale—the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS)—that was de-
signed to address important limitations of the sacrificial dilem-
mas paradigm. Third, we will propose a new theory of the
psychological sources of proto-utilitarian modes of thinking, a
theory that can explain the recent (puzzling) findings about
utilitarian judgment as well as generate new directions for
future research.
Current work in moral psychology has largely assumed that
utilitarian decision-making is a unitary psychological phenom-
enon. By contrast, the Two Dimensional (2D) model of utili-
tarian thinking we develop here highlights the distinct positive
and negative components of utilitarian decision-making. Al-
though these two dimensions overlap in explicit utilitarian
theorizing, they often come apart in the moral thinking of lay
persons and are indeed in some tension in that domain. We will
end by exploring the theoretical, methodological, and practical
implications of this overlooked division within utilitarian think-
ing. We will highlight, in particular, the way in which the 2D
model casts doubt upon dominant philosophical and psycholog-
ical accounts both of the psychological basis of utilitarianism
and of the sources of continuing resistance to it.
Utilitarianism and Moral Decision-Making in the
Lay Population
Ethical Theory and Moral Judgment in
Nonphilosophers
Although there is a large and growing body of psychological
research into utilitarian decision-making, this research has largely
proceeded without a precise account of the sense in which the
moral judgments of nonphilosophers can usefully be described be
in terms drawn from explicit philosophical theories (but see
Greene, 2008).
Moral philosophers develop, elaborate, and debate explicit eth-
ical theories. But although some ethical theories, or ideas derived
from such theories (e.g., the Kantian concept of human dignity),
occasionally become more widely known, there is little reason to
think that lay people employ explicit ethical theories in forming
their moral judgments—let alone the specific theories debated by
academic philosophers. It is plausible, however, that such philo-
sophical theories draw upon pretheoretical moral intuitions and
tendencies. It is also likely that both attraction to, and rejection of,
explicit ethical theories is driven, at least in part, by individual
differences in such pretheoretical moral tendencies. Such tenden-
cies would involve being responsive to and emphasizing the fac-
tors that a given ethical theory regards as morally relevant. They
will therefore often also be reflected by patterns of moral judg-
ments that at least partly mirror those supported by the theory. Less
centrally, such tendencies can also involve forms of moral reason-
ing and deliberation that echo (or are the precursors of) those
recommended by the theory.
Importantly, we should not treat such pretheoretical tendencies
in an all-or-nothing manner; few if any nonphilosophers are full-
blown utilitarians. Such tendencies are rather a matter of degree:
the moral thinking of ordinary individuals will approximate to a
greater or lesser extent—as well as in some but not other re-
spects—the patterns of judgments and response that characterize a
given explicit ethical theory.
One could still ask, however: Even if nonphilosophers do not
form their moral judgments by applying an explicit ethical theory,
why not simply ask them to what extent they endorse such a
theory? Although tempting, this approach is not, we claim, a
promising way to measure the moral views of ordinary people. To
begin with, there is considerable evidence that people often do not
have introspective access to the principles and factors to which
their moral judgments are actually responsive. In addition, their
judgments about concrete cases needn’t reflect the general moral
principles that they would endorse upon reflection (Cushman,
Young, & Hauser, 2006; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-Xing
Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Lombrozo, 2009). To illustrate: the utilitar-
ian idea that we should act in ways that promote everyone’s
happiness can sound very attractive in the abstract, but many reject
utilitarianism when they realize the highly counterintuitive impli-
cations of treating this idea as the sole criterion of moral action—
that is, its uncompromising demand for impartiality and self-
sacrifice, on the one hand, and for the sacrifice of innocent others
for the greater good, on the other (as, e.g., in Judith Jarvis Thom-
son’s [Thomson, 1985] case of killing a patient and using his
organs to save five others; see Horne, Powell, & Hummel, 2015).
Thus, even when people endorse the core utilitarian principle in the
abstract, their actual moral judgments may still be guided by
deontological considerations relating to rights, duties, or degrees
of personal relationship. In fact, lay people who endorse utilitarian
principles in the abstract do not tend to also reject opposing
deontological principles (Tanner, Medin, & Iliev, 2008). There-
fore, to measure the extent to which people approximate an ethical
theory such as utilitarianism, we need to approach things more
indirectly, by examining a broader range of patterns of moral
thought and judgment (Kahane & Shackel, 2010).
Finally, we need to strike a balance between philosophical
accuracy and empirical plausibility. It is unlikely that the moral
judgments of nonphilosophers mirror the most intricate and subtle
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forms of the ethical theories developed by philosophers, nor should
we expect the moral views of ordinary people to be fully consis-
tent. At the same time, if we use terms such as ‘utilitarian’ too
loosely, these terms will lack any interesting theoretical content
and, indeed, will mislead us into reading more into more mundane
forms of ordinary moral judgment than is really there (Kahane,
2015). In the next section, we give specific examples to illustrate
these considerations.
Understanding Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism involves more than the commonplace ideas that
we should aim to prevent suffering and promote happiness, or that
it is morally better to save more rather than fewer lives (all else
equal). Utilitarians make a far more radical claim: that we should
adopt a thoroughly impartial standpoint, aiming to maximize the
well-being of all persons (or even all sentient beings), regardless of
personal, emotional, spatial, or temporal distance (positive dimen-
sion); and that this should be our one and only aim, unconstrained
by any other moral rules, including rules forbidding us from
intentionally harming innocent others (negative dimension). In line
with the framework set out above, it is worth pausing to spell out
the distinctive patterns of moral thought and judgment involved in
each of these dimensions of utilitarianism.
The positive dimension of utilitarianism: Impartiality. The
philosophical core of utilitarianism lies in the impartial maximi-
zation of the greater good.1 To adopt a thoroughly impartial moral
standpoint is to treat the well-being of every individual as equally
important. No priority should be given to one’s own good, nor to
that of one’s family, friends, compatriots, or even fellow humans
over nonhuman animals. Such a standpoint would normally imply
highly demanding forms of self-sacrifice—whether by becoming
vegetarian or vegan, giving much of one’s money to effective
charities aiming to relieve suffering in distant countries, or perhaps
even donating one’s own kidney. Indeed, utilitarianism instructs
moral agents to sacrifice their own well-being even if there is only
a tiny increment in the well-being of others over what they them-
selves have lost.
Notice, however, that such moral impartiality is not the same
thing as altruism and self-sacrifice. Someone might not hesitate to
risk their life to save a drowning child, while at the same time
failing to conclude that they have any reason to give up an affluent
lifestyle. Ordinary, ‘commonsense’ morality encourages modest
acts of altruism (e.g., helping a beggar or making an occasional
donation to charity) and rewards heroism in the context of acute
emergencies. But complete impartiality requires more—much
more. The utilitarian Peter Singer, for example, is as we noted a
leading proponent of effective altruism, a movement built around
the idea of using reason and evidence to identify the best ways of
helping others. Many effective altruists have pledged to give at
least 10% of their income to cost-effective charities (MacAskill,
2015; Singer, 2015)—and even this arguably falls considerably
short of the strict utilitarian ideal. In the U.K., the median amount
given to charity per year is £168, and of the four most popular
causes that people donate to (charities focused on children, med-
ical research, animals, and hospices: Charities Aid Foundation,
2016), none are focused on the developing world, where arguably
the most good can be done. With a median salary of around
£27,000, on utilitarian effective altruism principles we should
donate at least £2,700—or 16 times the actual amount—and we
should send it to charities that would impartially do the most good.
In fact, people typically do neither.
Utilitarianism diverges from ordinary morality not only with
respect to how much we should sacrifice but also for whose sake.
Some individuals engage in acts of extreme self-sacrifice—in
some cases, sacrificing their lives to promote the good of their
family, country, or religious group. But such altruistic acts are
hardly expressions of impartiality since they focus on one’s
friends, family, or ingroup. Utilitarianism, by contrast, actually
forbids us from giving any special priority to those close to us over
others (saving the lives of compatriots, or even family, before
those of distant strangers); indeed, if it would maximize welfare,
we must make sacrifices for our greatest enemies. Of course, how
much one approximates this impartial ideal is a matter of degree—
even avowed utilitarians admit that they fail to realize it without
qualification (Singer, 2015). Finally, there is more than one way of
departing from this ideal: a religious fundamentalist may discount
self interest in favor of her ingroup while an egoist might care only
about himself without differentiating much between strangers and
his closest family members.2
The negative dimension of utilitarianism: Harming and
breaking rules. Although a thoroughly impartial moral outlook
is necessary for utilitarianism, it is not sufficient. One can adopt
such an outlook while still holding that the goal of maximizing
everyone’s well-being must only be pursued in line with various
moral rules constraining us from certain ways of harming innocent
people, lying, breaking promises, and the like. In other words, even
if one endorses this impartial moral goal, one may still think that
we are forbidden from taking certain means to achieve it. The
negative component of classical utilitarianism is the denial that
there are any such constraints. We should of course still usually tell
the truth, keep our promises, and refuse to harm innocent people—
but only when (and because) these acts are likely to lead to a better
impartial outcome. When they get in the way of achieving such an
outcome, such familiar moral rules can and should be broken.
The most central of these rules relates to what we called instru-
mental harm—willingness to harm and even kill others when this
is needed to achieve a better outcome. Such a willingness can be
seen when—as in the classic thought experiment—someone
1 Some nonutilitarian moral views, including Kantianism and some
forms of Christian and Buddhist ethics, are also radically impartial (e.g.,
Kant tells us to give equal respect to all rational beings) but that impar-
tiality is not expressed in the goal of maximizing the well-being of all.
2 For ease of presentation, we distinguished here the degree of the
sacrifices we make to aid others and for whose sake we make these
sacrifices—specifically, whether in doing so we treat everyone’s well-
being as equally important. This could give the impression that impartial
beneficence consists of how beneficent we are (degree of sacrifice) and
how impartial we are (whether or not we prioritize certain others). How-
ever, from a utilitarian standpoint these are not conceptually distinct:
prioritizing the self and prioritizing family, friends, or compatriots, are both
forms of partiality that utilitarianism rejects (unless such differential treat-
ment can be justified in impartial terms—e.g., if we can generate more
utility by taking care of those we know well). Moreover, impartial benef-
icence needn’t require any sacrifice—as, for example, when one has to
choose whether to prevent harm to a family member versus a greater
number of strangers. Still, while complete impartiality involves giving
equal importance to the good of all individuals (including oneself), depar-
tures from such impartiality can go both in the direction of greater prior-
itisation of self and greater prioritisation of those close to us.
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pushes an innocent person off a footbridge to save a greater
number of lives. But it can also be seen in more realistic examples,
such as when someone holds that torture is morally acceptable if
needed to reduce the risk of a major terrorist attack. Similar
reasoning explains why some utilitarians support the legalization
of so-called ‘active euthanasia’ as well as, more controversially,
the abortion (and in some cases even infanticide) of the severely
disabled. However, willingness to cause instrumental harm is not
the only way in which utilitarians reject the authority of many
other putative moral rules—including, as mentioned, those relating
to honesty and keeping promises, as well as to fairness, hierarchy,
and ‘purity’ (i.e., a concern for strict sexual and other boundaries).
It is for this reason that utilitarians were among the earliest to
support the legalization of homosexuality and, more generally, to
defend a permissive attitude toward sexuality (Bentham, 1785/
1978).
One final clarification. Just as one can endorse an impartial aim
to maximize welfare without rejecting common moral constraints,
so can one reject many or even most of these rules and values
without endorsing the impartial positive aim of utilitarianism. An
avowed egoist, for example, might also regard constraints against
lying or even killing in a purely instrumental way yet see no reason
at all to care about the greater good.3
Degrees of Proto-Utilitarian Tendencies in Lay
Moral Judgment
Understood as an explicit ethical theory, classical utilitarianism
is firmly committed both to unqualified impartiality and to the
rejection of all inherent moral constraints on the maximization of
aggregate well-being. Now, few if any nonphilosophers are likely
to consciously apply such an explicit theory. However, the moral
thinking of ordinary people may approximate such an outlook to
varying degrees. We propose that the closer a person approaches
moral questions in ways that give weight to the concepts and
considerations central to paradigmatic utilitarianism (i.e., the ‘clas-
sic’ view associated with Bentham and Mill), the stronger the
utilitarian tendencies of that individual. Spelled out in the terms set
out above, a person’s moral thinking should count as more utili-
tarian (a) the greater its focus on the impartial maximization of
well-being across different moral contexts (positive dimension)
and (b) the less space and weight it gives to values other than
well-being, and to moral rules constraining the promotion of
well-being (negative dimension).4
With respect to (a), we have seen that an individual can reject
impartial morality both by privileging the self and by privileging
family, friends, or compatriots, or generally those who are spatially
and temporally closer. With respect to (b), the other values and
rules in question could be both a matter of number (e.g., traditional
morality accepts multiple moral rules that can constrain the pro-
motion of aggregate well-being, such as rules relating to hierarchy,
purity, and so on; see Haidt, 2012) and strength (e.g., libertarians
typically accept far fewer moral rules than traditionalists, but the
few rules they do accept with respect to, e.g., property rights are
extremely strong). In their strongest form, such competing moral
rules state absolute prohibitions. But they needn’t be as strong as
that. Many nonutilitarians accept that we can break certain moral
rules (e.g., relating to truth-telling or promises) when adhering to
them would lead to significant harm (Holyoak & Powell, 2016),
and plenty of nonutilitarians are willing to endorse causing severe
harm to innocents in situations where the costs of refusing to do so
are catastrophic (Fried, 1978). Stronger rules will have higher
thresholds, and different individuals will draw those thresholds at
different points (Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014).
Someone who thinks about morality in unqualifiedly impartial
terms, privileging no one over another while rejecting any con-
straint whatsoever on the maximization of well-being, would count
as fully utilitarian on the proposed construct. Such a person would
closely conform, at least in their moral thinking, to classical act
utilitarianism, and to the form of utilitarianism presently defended
by philosophers such as Peter Singer (2011).
Utilitarianism can also take other forms. One is ‘rule’ utilitari-
anism, which holds that the morally right action is the one that
conforms to rules that, if widely adhered to, would maximize
well-being. There are also nonutilitarian forms of consequential-
ism that recognize values beyond that of utility (e.g., the value of
fairness) and even accommodate forms of partiality (Scheffler,
1982; Sen, 1983). Because they depart from classical utilitarianism
in ways that bring them closer to commonsense morality, adher-
ents of such views would count as somewhat less utilitarian on the
proposed construct.
It may be worth clarifying at the outset why we privilege
classical act utilitarianism in this way. First, as a minor point, this
is the form of utilitarianism assumed by most work in current
moral psychology; our framework aims to improve on existing
practice but also to be continuous with it rather than to change the
subject. Second and more importantly, classical act utilitarianism
is the original form of the view and remains the most famous, most
influential, and most controversial. Third, some more recent de-
velopments of utilitarianism (e.g., ‘motive’ or ‘global’ utilitarian-
ism, or the distinction between criterion-of-rightness and decision-
procedure; see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015) are probably too subtle
or complex to be reflected in the moral thinking of nonphiloso-
phers: it is not by accident that it took many decades of intense
philosophical reflection to identify these variants. Fourth, most
important deviations from classical act utilitarianism—rule utili-
tarianism, satisficing utilitarianism and nonutilitarian consequen-
tialism being prime examples—are attempts to bring utilitarianism
closer to commonsense morality and tone down its more radical
and counterintuitive aspects. Since we are proposing a way to rank
moral outlooks as more or less utilitarian, it is hard to see what
could replace the most unqualified form of the view (which also
3 Notice, however, that we defined ‘instrumental harm’ as harm that
aims to bring about a greater good. Throwing someone onto the track of a
train just for fun is thus not a case of instrumental harm in our sense. Does
this mean that instrumental harm inherently involves an element of impar-
tial beneficence, and is therefore an overlapping construct? Endorsing
instrumental harm involves an element of beneficence, that is, acting in
ways that benefit (or prevent harm to) others and, indeed, in a way that is
responsive to the number of lives saved. But such an act typically involves
no self-sacrifice nor need it express any kind of impartiality—in typical
sacrificial dilemmas, both the person to be sacrificed and those who can be
saved are strangers. Notice also that beneficence in this weak sense is a
mundane moral notion that is endorsed by virtually all moral views,
including stringent deontological theories.
4 At the theoretical level, it is possible to understand giving moral weight
to different forms of partiality as themselves reflecting a set of deontologi-
cal rules. But in the psychological context it is more illuminating to treat
this dimension separately.
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happens to be the most paradigmatic) at the ‘top’ of the scale.
Importantly, however, other forms of utilitarianism are not ignored
by our framework—their adherents would be ranked as leaning
strongly toward utilitarianism but somewhat less so than classical
utilitarians. This seems exactly right.
As we move further away from utilitarianism in its paradigmatic
forms, we find approaches to morality that are increasingly partial
and that recognize a greater number of increasingly stringent
deontological constraints. Individuals who think of morality in
these ways would count as low on utilitarian dispositions. Notice,
though, that the construct we are developing is a measure of
utilitarian tendencies, not a general taxonomy of possible moral
views. There are multiple ways to reject utilitarianism—we al-
ready mentioned traditional morality, libertarianism, Kantian eth-
ics and other rights-based approaches; there is also virtue ethics
(Hursthouse, 1999) as well as others. These are very different
nonutilitarian views, and the proposed construct is not intended to
differentiate between them.
Finally, although we explained above what would count as a
stronger or weaker utilitarian tendency by reference to a range of
utilitarian and nonutilitarian theories, it bears emphasizing again
that the construct we have in mind is a measure of broad tenden-
cies in moral deliberation and judgment in the lay population. It is
not likely that ordinary people apply anything resembling an
explicit ethical theory (whether utilitarian or not), nor is it likely
that their moral judgments are fully consistent across different
moral contexts.
Existing Measures of Utilitarian Decision-Making
Sacrificial Dilemmas
Armed with this theoretical framework, we can return to the
sacrificial dilemmas paradigm. Sacrificial dilemmas are by far the
most dominant experimental paradigm in contemporary moral
psychology (Christensen & Gomila, 2012), and are widely as-
sumed to be a reliable measure of utilitarian decision-making.
Prosacrifice responses to such dilemmas are routinely classified as
‘utilitarian judgments,’ and the psychological processes and mech-
anisms implicated in such judgments interpreted as reflecting
general features of utilitarian decision-making (Greene, 2008).
Moreover, the number of prosacrifice responses to batteries of
such dilemmas are widely used as measures of differences in
utilitarian tendencies both within (Bègue & Laine, 2017; Lom-
brozo, 2009) and between populations (Koenigs et al., 2007).
The work of Greene and colleagues on sacrificial dilemmas has
been deeply influential to the field. It has spurred more than a
decade of fascinating research in moral psychology, and has made
substantial advances to our understanding of instrumental harm.
That said, despite—or perhaps because of—how popular sacrifi-
cial dilemmas have been in moral psychology, this approach has
naturally invited some criticism, for example, relating to the highly
artificial character of the scenarios typically used (Bauman,
McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014). Our aim here is not to offer
further criticism of this paradigm but to highlight its limits as a
general measure of utilitarian tendencies.
Sacrificial dilemmas only directly measure what we call the
negative dimension of utilitarianism. In fact, they measure only
attitudes to instrumental harm—just one aspect of the negative
dimension, albeit a very important one, given the moral centrality
of prohibitions against harming others. To judge that, for example,
we should push one innocent person off a footbridge is to reject (or
at least discount) one possible deontological rule against directly
harming someone (as a means to preventing a greater harm to
others). But one could reject this particular deontological rule
while still accepting many other rules—for example, rules relating
to fairness, honesty, or promise-keeping. And one can certainly
reject this rule while remaining highly partial in one’s moral
decision-making.
That someone makes a judgment that happens to be in line with
utilitarianism in a specific context does not, of course, immediately
show that their judgments stem from, or are responsive to, the con-
siderations that lie at the heart of a utilitarian moral outlook. Nor does
it show that they will make judgments in a way that resembles such
an outlook in other contexts. It is nevertheless an empirical possibility
that prosacrifice responses to sacrificial dilemmas reflect the applica-
tion of a general utilitarian principle (‘impartially maximize expected
utility’) or even indicate a broader tendency to approach moral
decision-making in a utilitarian manner. If that were the case, this
could potentially justify the near exclusive focus on sacrificial dilem-
mas, because utilitarian decision-making would be a unitary psycho-
logical phenomenon in the context of the lay population, with a
common set of processes and factors leading to judgments in line with
utilitarianism in a range of moral contexts. By studying responses to
sacrificial dilemmas, we would be shedding light on this general
phenomenon. This assumption is implicit in Greene’s pioneering
research (Greene, 2008), which is largely focused on sacrificial di-
lemmas yet makes general claims about utilitarian decision-making
and judgments. But the assumption that utilitarian decision-making is
a unitary psychological phenomenon that is fully (or even uniquely)
reflected in prosacrifice responses to sacrificial dilemmas also seems
to underlie much other research employing such dilemmas whereby
results are routinely stated as supporting general conclusions about
the psychology of utilitarian decision-making (see, e.g., Côté, Piff, &
Willer, 2013; Duke & Bègue, 2015; Koenigs et al., 2007; Robinson,
Joel, & Plaks, 2015). And yet, the association we discussed earlier
between ‘utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and antisocial
traits such as psychopathy in both clinical (Koenigs et al., 2012) and
subclinical (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Glenn et al., 2010; Kahane et al.,
2015; Wiech et al., 2013) populations casts doubt upon this assump-
tion. Still other studies have shown a relationship between prosacrifice
judgments and libertarian political views (Iyer, Koleva, Graham,
Ditto, & Haidt, 2012) as well as explicit endorsement of various forms
of egoism (Kahane et al., 2015), both of which give heightened or
even exclusive priority to one’s own self-interest over the welfare of
others.
Psychopaths are obviously not paragons of impartial concern for
the greater good, and egoists explicitly reject any such concern.
These findings directly contradict the strict impartial concern for
all people’s interests that is at the core of utilitarian theory. Further
departure from such impartiality is seen in research suggesting that
prosacrifice judgments are more likely to be made when they are
in the participants’ self-interest (Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008), and
in research suggesting that rates of prosacrifice judgments are
strongly influenced by in-group membership: whether the compar-
ison is between foreigners versus compatriots (Swann, Gomez,
Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010), strangers versus family members
(Petrinovich, O’Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993), or even animals versus
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humans (Petrinovich et al., 1993), in-group members are more
likely to be saved. Such findings suggest that prosacrifice judg-
ments in these dilemmas are rarely based in the kind of impartial
maximization of aggregate welfare that utilitarianism demands.
In Kahane et al. (2015) we directly investigated the relationship
between a tendency to make prosacrifice judgments in sacrificial
dilemmas and a wide range of measures of impartial moral concern
for the greater good in other contexts. Such measures included:
willingness to donate money to reduce the suffering of those in
need in poor countries, rejecting favoritism toward one’s compa-
triots over distant strangers, and identifying with the whole of
humanity. We consistently found either no relation or a negative
relation between prosacrifice judgments and such impartial con-
cern for the greater good (Kahane et al., 2015). These findings
suggest that an impartial moral view may actually be in tension
with a permissive attitude toward instrumental harm. Our hypoth-
esis gains some support from other recent research. Although
psychopathy has been associated with smaller amygdalae, reduced
amygdala responses to fear-related stimuli, inferior ability to rec-
ognize fearful expressions, (Dawel, O’Kearney, McKone, & Pal-
ermo, 2012; Marsh & Blair, 2008), and reduced empathic concern
(Decety, Lewis, & Cowell, 2015), recent studies of individuals
who donated their kidney to a complete stranger—an extreme form
of altruism which is strongly consistent with the positive core of
utilitarianism—found that such individuals have large right
amygdalae and superior ability to recognize fearful expressions,
compared with control subjects (Marsh et al., 2014). Such
extreme altruism was also found to be associated with higher
empathic concern (Brethel-Haurwitz, Stoycos, Cardinale,
Huebner, & Marsh, 2016) and reduced social discounting to-
ward distant strangers (Vekaria, Brethel-Haurwitz, Cardinale,
Stoycos, & Marsh, 2017), indicating greater impartiality.
Utilitarian judgments in sacrificial dilemmas clearly do not
measure the positive dimension of utilitarianism. In fact, it is not
clear that they measure its negative dimension more generally,
beyond attitudes to instrumental harm. For example, Kahane et al.
(2012) found no association between prosacrifice judgments in
sacrificial dilemmas and greater endorsement of lying when it
leads to greater overall utility (another characteristic utilitarian
judgment). It thus seems that rejecting moral rules relating to
instrumental harm does not predict the rejection of deontological
rules in other domains (e.g., relating to honesty).
These results make sense when one considers that although utili-
tarians and deontologists often do endorse contrasting responses to
sacrificial dilemmas, these dilemmas were not designed by philoso-
phers as a way of bringing out the core disagreement between utili-
tarianism and its opponents. In fact—contrary to what is commonly
assumed by many researchers—the ‘trolley’ scenarios on which sac-
rificial dilemmas are based were actually introduced as a way of
exploring certain issues within the deontological approach (see Foot,
1967; Thomson, 1985). Thus, although sacrificial dilemmas were an
important first step in studying utilitarian decision-making, and have
already yielded valuable findings about attitudes in favor of and
against instrumental harm, they need to be supplemented with further
tools that allow us to study utilitarian decision-making along both its
dimensions, and that do not rest on the assumption that utilitarian
decision-making refers to any unified psychological phenomenon in
the everyday context—an assumption that is already put into question
by the evidence we have reviewed.
The theoretical framework we propose here makes no such prob-
lematic assumptions. Importantly, it avoids classifying the moral
judgments of nonphilosophers as ‘utilitarian,’ and does not conceive
of proto-utilitarian tendencies in ordinary people in terms of the
frequency of such judgments—let alone their frequency in one highly
specific moral domain. Instead, our proposed framework understands
utilitarian tendencies in terms of the distance of broader patterns of
moral dispositions from the paradigmatic concerns of an unqualified
utilitarian outlook, leaving open the possibility that one can be more
or less utilitarian in some respects yet not in others.
In an important contribution, Conway & Gawronski (2013) used
a process dissociation approach to disentangle two distinct factors
that can drive prosacrifice judgments: a permissive attitude to
directly harming others, and giving greater weight to saving the
larger number. This is a significant advance, but it is worth
explaining why it does not address the issues we have been raising.
Although the two may sound similar, the distinction between a
permissive attitude to harm and increased weight to consequences
in the context of sacrificial dilemmas does not correspond to our
distinction between negative and positive dimensions of utilitari-
anism. To judge that saving five lives is morally more important
than sacrificing the life of another in an emergency situation in no
way indicates the kind of impartiality that is at the heart of the
positive dimension of utilitarianism, because such an act involves
neither self-sacrifice nor regarding distant strangers as having the
same moral importance as those dear or near to us. After all,
standard sacrificial dilemmas do not typically involve a choice
between those close to us and others, and the relevant individuals
are all in great proximity. While the link between antisocial traits
and greater rates of prosacrifice judgment is likely to be associated
with reduced aversion to causing harm rather than increased con-
cern with saving more lives (Conway & Gawronski, 2013), in
Kahane et al. (2015) we found that prosacrifice judgments were
not associated with markers of impartial concern for the greater
good even when we controlled for such antisocial traits.5
Existing Individual Difference Scales
An adequate measure of proto-utilitarian psychological tenden-
cies would need to collect responses that are not confined to a
specific moral context. This would be hard to achieve effectively
using detailed vignettes along the lines of conventional sacrificial
dilemmas, since a great many such vignettes would be needed to
5 Conway and Gawronski (2013) label a reluctance to endorse directly
harming others a ‘deontological inclination’ and giving greater weight to
saving more lives a ‘utilitarian inclination.’ But as one of us has argued
(Kahane, 2015), this opposition can also be understood as one between a
duty not to harm (nonmaleficence) and a duty to rescue/aid (broadly falling
within the duty of beneficence). Understood in this way, this opposition
really operates within a deontological framework (Ross, 2002 system of
prima facie duties is a classic example of such a framework). As discussed
above, what is distinctive of utilitarianism isn’t that it recognizes a duty of
beneficence but that it (a) interprets it in a radically impartial and maxi-
mizing way, and (b) regards it as the whole of morality. Notice that to
approach sacrificial dilemmas (and instrumental harm more generally) in a
thoroughly utilitarian manner, it is not enough to give greater weight to
beneficence (i.e., to saving five lives); one must also thoroughly reject any
deontological constraint on directly harming others—that is, one must also
have no deontological inclination whatsoever, in Gawronski and Conway’s
terms. It is enough that the number of lives saved counts for more; for a
utilitarian, it is the only thing that counts (Kahane, 2015).
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cover a wide range of scenarios, and this would be unduly bur-
densome on both participants and researchers. To the extent that
we regard proto-utilitarian decision-making tendencies as a fairly
stable feature of individuals, a preferable approach would be to
administer a scale that could capture individual differences in such
tendencies using shorter items. Several such scales purporting to
measure utilitarian (or, more broadly, ‘consequentialist’) tenden-
cies have already been developed—for example, the Consequen-
tialist Thinking Scale (Piazza & Sousa, 2014), Baron’s Revised
Utilitarianism Scale (U-Scale: Baron, Scott, Fincher, & Emlen
Metz, 2015)—which includes parts of the Consequentialist Think-
ing Scale—and Robinson’s unpublished Consequentialist Scale
(Robinson, 2012). However, these scales have broadly the same
limitations as the sacrificial dilemmas we discussed above: as with
sacrificial dilemmas, they typically only capture the negative di-
mension of utilitarianism, with characteristic items across the
scales including “When we can help some people a lot by harming
other people a little, we should do this” (Baron et al., 2015);
“Killing someone can be morally right if it is for the greater good”
(Baron et al., 2015; Piazza & Sousa, 2014); and “It is never
morally justified to cause someone harm” (reverse scored; Robin-
son, 2012). In other words, these scales largely ignore utilitarian-
ism’s positive impartial ideal and the practical contexts in which it
may be manifested (e.g., situations that pit self-interest or concern
for those close to us against the well-being of distant strangers).
Moreover, formal scale development procedures such as explor-
atory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) have not been reported for some existing scales (e.g., Baron
et al., 2015; Piazza & Sousa, 2014). Using empirical, data-driven,
models for scale development is particularly important when try-
ing to measure an abstract concept like utilitarianism because it
cannot be assumed a priori that what is conceptually unitary in the
philosophical context will also be so in the psychology of ordinary
people (Kahane, 2015; see Supplemental Materials for a more
extended discussion of existing scales). The need for a new scale
is therefore apparent.
A New Approach to Measuring Proto-Utilitarian
Tendencies
Both conceptual considerations and considerable empirical ev-
idence strongly suggest that sacrificial dilemmas are a limited
basis for studying utilitarian tendencies, and an adequate scale has
not yet been developed. To study utilitarian decision-making in the
lay population, a new measure is required. The theoretical frame-
work we outlined above suggests an alternative approach.
First and foremost, an adequate tool for investigating proto-
utilitarian tendencies would need to draw on philosophical exper-
tise to ensure that the psychological construct being measured
correctly captures the relevant ethical concepts. But it also needs to
make sure that the construct maps on to tendencies in general
populations rather than the theoretical views of professional phi-
losophers. Consequently, such a tool would need to be a measure
of degrees of individual differences in utilitarian tendencies in-
stead of an all-or-nothing construct. Few individuals in the lay
population are likely to be full-fledged utilitarians, but some may
be more utilitarian than others, or may be so only along certain
dimensions.
Second, in contrast to both sacrificial dilemmas and existing
individual difference questionnaires that purport to measure utili-
tarian or ‘consequentialist’ tendencies (but which similarly focus
on willingness to cause harm), such a measure would need to cover
both the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ aspects of utilitarianism. That is,
the scale should also cover the degree to which individuals think
about morality and the well-being of others in impartial terms,
giving no more (or less) moral priority to the self, as well as to
those with whom one has close ties.
The present study aimed to develop a new measure of individual
differences in utilitarian tendencies that meets the above desider-
ata. It also sought to use this new measure to study the relationship
between utilitarian tendencies and various other traits to advance
our understanding of proto-utilitarian thinking. Because the desid-
erata include treating utilitarian tendencies as a matter of degree
and assessing responses across a range of moral situations (i.e., not
only in relation to willingness to violently sacrifice others), we
developed a measure more along trait-level individual differences
in utilitarian tendencies rather than a measure of an episodic
psychological process—that is, a measure of whether or not a
subject is engaged in ‘utilitarian decision-making’ at a given point
in time. In other words, the measure we developed is akin to
measures of individual differences in endorsement of core moral
values, such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et
al., 2011). Notice, however, that while we aimed to develop a
measure of the moral outlook of individuals, such a measure would
also provide strong (if defeasible) evidence about the moral factors
that underlie their moral judgments in more specific contexts. For
example, if such a measure indicates that someone’s moral outlook
is strongly impartial, this would make it more likely that this
person’s judgments about, for example, permissible harm, duties
of aid, or the stringency of promises, reflect such impartiality.
Given this need to measure responses across a range of moral
situations and dimensions, a battery of detailed moral dilemmas
would be long and cumbersome. We therefore opted for a short
scale measuring responses to a list of brief items. Finally, to ensure
that the proposed scale adequately reflects the relevant philosoph-
ical concepts and theories, our scale was developed by a joint team
of psychologists and moral philosophers. We formulated the pool
of items on which the scale is based by conducting a systematic
review of the ethical literature; these items were then vetted by




To develop and validate our scale, we set in advance and then
followed a formal scale development procedure to ensure that our
measure was both reliable and valid. First, we created an initial pool
of items based on the existing literature on the target construct of
utilitarianism. After paring the pool down by, for example, eliminat-
ing redundancies or unclear items, we submitted the items to an expert
panel of academic philosophers for review, and then modified the
items in response to their feedback. Third, we recruited a large sample
of participants to complete the revised pool of items and then con-
ducted a series of exploratory factor analyses (EFA) to obtain the best
factor structure with the best items. Fourth, we conducted a series of
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confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to evaluate and refine the best
factor structure based on predetermined indices of model fit obtained
from recent recommendations in the literature. Fifth, we recruited a
new sample of participants to complete the items determined by the
CFA and then we confirmed, using this new sample, that the measure
had appropriate factor structure and psychometric properties. Sixth,
we confirmed that the data fit this model and factor structure better
than alternative models (e.g., that a multidimensional model obtained
from the CFA accounted for the data better than a one-dimensional
model, or vice versa). Seventh, we explored construct validity by
testing how scores on the final scale obtained from the previous steps
were connected to other established measures. Finally, based on
helpful feedback from reviewers of a previous draft of this paper, we
investigated external validity by administering the scale to an expert
sample of graduate students and academics specializing in moral
philosophy. A more extended account of the scale development pro-
cess can be found in the Supplemental Materials; in the interests of
brevity we report only the essential information in the main paper.
Item Generation
An initial pool of items was generated through a comprehensive
survey of the existing literature on utilitarianism. In creating the
initial pool of items, several considerations were taken into ac-
count. First, we judged it necessary to include items that tapped
into the abstract tenets of utilitarianism as well as items that bore
on real-world moral judgments that track utilitarian thinking. Sec-
ond, it was essential to include items that captured both the
positive and negative components of utilitarianism: namely, that
the right act is the one that impartially maximizes the greater good
(positive component), and that this maximization is all there is to
morality such that deontological rules and constraints must be
rejected when they stand in the way of achieving this goal (neg-
ative component). Moreover, we hoped to have a range of items
that included: (a) abstract statements of utilitarian belief (b) an-
tiutilitarian views, (c) items reflecting the application of utilitari-
anism to concrete contexts, and (d) items briefly stating seminal
examples or illustrations used by both critics and defenders of
utilitarianism. Finally, the items all involved moral judgments of
various kinds. For simplicity of presentation, these were phrased
using a range of explicit normative terms with synonymous or
closely overlapping content such as what is ‘right,’ ‘required,’ or
what we ‘should do’ or are ‘obliged to do’ (prior studies suggest
that such minor variation in wording has little or no effect on
responses; O’Hara, Sinnott-Armstrong, & Sinnott-Armstrong,
2010). When an item could also be interpreted in legal terms, we
made it explicit that the question was concerned with what is
morally right or wrong rather than legally right or wrong—that is,
with what we should do from a moral point of view.
We employed both a ‘bottom-up’ and a ‘top-down’ approach to
identifying relevant items. The ‘bottom-up’ approach involved com-
piling sources from the existing empirical literature purporting to
measure utilitarian judgments and extracting relevant citations from
their references sections in a systematic fashion (e.g., Greene et al.,
2001; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; Piazza & Sousa, 2014; Robinson,
2012). This resulted in more than 200 items, mostly in the form of
vignettes or short statements describing moral dilemmas. An initial
review of these items revealed considerable redundancy in terms of
theoretical content, with the majority of cases clustering around vari-
ants of the well-known ‘push’ and ‘switch’ dilemmas (Foot, 1967;
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Thomson,
1985). We therefore deemed it necessary to perform a ‘top-down’
analysis, as well, to ensure a more robust theoretical foundation. For
this analysis, we drew on the philosophical literature as well as the
expertise of professional moral philosophers—including members of
the present research team—and reviewed both classical and more
recent discussions of utilitarianism. Classical statements of the theory
included those by Bentham (1789/1983), Mill (1863), and Sidgwick
(1901); important recent contributions included work by, for example,
Smart and Williams (1973), along with critiques (e.g., Rawls, 1971)
and defenses (e.g., Kagan, 1989) of utilitarianism or consequentialism
more generally, as well as influential further developments of the
theory (e.g., Parfit, 1984). We also took care to include works focus-
ing on the practical implications of utilitarianism (e.g., Singer, 1993).
Special emphasis was put on identifying key points of conflict be-
tween a strict utilitarian approach and commonsense morality as well
as competing ethical theories—conflicts that include willingness to
cause harm, break moral rules, compromise virtue or integrity, place
limits on the demandingness of morality, and so forth. Finally, after
filtering out major redundancies between items, irrelevant items, and
poorly worded or confusing items, we were left with a smaller pool of
94 items that were then edited for theoretical clarity and ease of
understanding.
Expert Review
Having generated this pool of 94 items based on initial assessments
from within the research team, we then recruited an external panel of
leading experts to review the items. Our panel consisted of 11 pro-
fessional philosophers working in ethics or moral philosophy who had
a diversity of viewpoints (including classical act utilitarians, conse-
quentialists who depart from classical utilitarian views, and ethicists
who reject consequentialism in all of its forms). Our expert panel
included some of the most prominent living contributors to the phil-
osophical literature on utilitarianism, for example, Peter Singer,
Shelly Kagan, John Broome, and Alistair Norcross. To ensure that our
final set of items would be intelligible to nonphilosophers, we asked
our experts to evaluate the items in terms of their brevity, simplicity,
and accessibility, while maintaining theoretical specificity. At the
same time, we explained that the planned scale was intended to
measure utilitarian tendencies in nonphilosophers, such that highly
subtle philosophical distinctions that were unlikely to be relevant in
such a context should not be emphasized in the assessment of items
(see Supplemental Materials for actual text and instructions). In an
online survey, each expert was given a list of all 94 statements and
asked to indicate “How good do you think this item is for discrimi-
nating utilitarian and nonutilitarian views?” (1 ! not at all; 5 ! very
much),6 with space for written comments. Our interest was primarily
in the experts’ qualitative feedback and comments on the items, but
we also collected the numerical ratings as a complementary source of
data. We then removed or modified items to incorporate the experts’
philosophical insights on a case-by-case basis, carefully considering
their written comments and their corresponding numerical ratings. We
opted for a relatively inclusive pool of items, only dropping items that
6 We also asked the experts to indicate “How much do you personally
agree with this statement?” (1 ! not at all; 5 ! very much). These data
were not used in the present study.
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the experts found particularly unhelpful to discriminating utilitarian
and nonutilitarian views. The items that were retained had a mean
rating of 3.52 and those that were dropped a mean rating of 2.96. In
a substantial number of cases a lower rating reflected ‘fixable’ con-
cerns about the wording of an item rather than intractable concerns
about its underlying content; in these cases we opted to revise the
items rather than drop them. The specific suggestions of the experts
were discussed within the research team until a consensus on exclu-
sion or revised wording was achieved.
These efforts resulted in a smaller pool of 77 items with which
to conduct the next stage of the scale development: the exploratory
factor analysis in a lay sample. It is worth noting that although the
experts were given space to propose new items for inclusion in our
scale, none was suggested, indicating that the 94 items provided
good coverage of the relevant moral issues. And while the numer-
ical data were not our focus, all of the original items that the
experts rated and which were included in the final scale (including
modification, if necessary) were rated above the midpoint of the
scale, suggesting that they were good items for discriminating
utilitarian and nonutilitarian views.
Study 1
Ethics Statement
Relevant ethical guidelines were followed and the research was
approved through University of Oxford’s Central University Re-
search Ethics Committee, with the reference number MSD-
R50145/RE001. Written informed consent was obtained electron-
ically from all participants.
Participants and Procedure
1009 participants completed the survey online using Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were excluded from anal-
ysis if they completed the survey more than once (in which case
only their first attempt was included), or if they failed one or more
of five simple attention checks embedded among the items requir-
ing them to “Please click scale point X to confirm you are paying
attention.” This left a final sample of 960 participants (489 female,
Mage ! 35, SD ! 12.11), of whom the majority of participants had
attended college or higher education (81%). Participants were
given the expert-assessed list of 77 items, presented in a semiran-
domized order. For each item, participants were asked to “indicate
how much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements” (1 ! strongly disagree, 4 ! neither agree nor dis-
agree, 7 ! strongly agree).
Our final sample size of 960 was more than adequate. Compared
with experimental designs and statistical techniques such as
ANOVA where one can compute the required power given the
effect size, determination of sample size for factor analysis is
notoriously tricky (Mundfrom, Shaw, & Ke, 2005). One approach
is to focus on the absolute sample size. While some have suggested
a minimum sample size of 250 (Cattell, 1978) or even 100 (Gor-
such, 1983), more recent estimates have suggested that a good
sample size is at least 300, and that 1,000 or more is excellent
(Comrey & Lee, 1992). Another approach is to focus more on the
subject-to-item ratio, or the number of participants for each item
used. It is typically accepted that a subject-to-item ratio should be
no lower than 5:1 (Gorsuch, 1983), and that 10:1 is appropriate
(Everitt, 1975; Nunnally, 1978). Based on these considerations, we
therefore decided to recruit 1000 participants. This represented an
excellent absolute sample size, and (with 77 items), gave us a good
final subject-to-item ratio of 12:1.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
We first performed a series of exploratory factor analyses (EFA)
on the full set of items (77 in total) to ascertain the underlying
factor structure. For factor extraction, we used both Kaiser’s
criterion (eigenvalues set to 1) in conjunction with inspecting the
scree plots. We did this because Kaiser’s criterion tends to over-
extract factors when the number of variables is large (Linn, 1968).
For all EFAs, we used the maximum likelihood estimator with
direct oblimin rotation. The first EFA, according to Kaiser’s cri-
terion, yielded 19 factors explaining 57% of the variance in the 77
items whereas the scree plot indicated a 6 factor solution. Inspect-
ing the rotated factor matrix indicated that a number of items did
not load onto any factor, as indicated by a factor loading falling
under the .30 mark. We excluded these 13 items and reran the
EFA. This second EFA indicated that a further 5 items did not load
significantly onto any factor. We repeated this process a total of 10
times. The 10th EFA yielded a four-factor solution that explained
43% of the variance in all the items. See Table 1 for the factor
solution and for the reliabilities.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Next, using the lavaan package in R, we performed a Confir-
matory Factor Analysis (CFA) on the items obtained from the
initial EFA structure (see Table 2 for items). For the CFA, we used
the maximum likelihood estimator with robust standard errors and
a combination of fit indices to adjudge model fit. There are a
plethora of model fit indices at a researcher’s disposal, with
disagreement as to what the cut-offs for these indices should be
(for an overview, see Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). There
are concerns with using only one indicator of model fit (if some
indices are more favorable than others, then this could be the only
one reported), and so prior to data collection we decided to report
four of the most widely acceptable and recommended indices: the
chi-square statistic; root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) and its associated confidence interval; the standardized
root-mean-square residual (SRMR), and comparative fit index
(CFI; Bentler, 2007; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kenny, 2015; Kline,
2005). In the process of writing the paper we decided to also report
the two parsimony fit indices, AIC and BIC, as recommended by
Hooper et al. (2008). Therefore, following the best recommenda-
tions in the literature, we conducted and report a combination of
six model fit indices: the chi-square statistic; RMSEA and its
associated confidence interval; SRMR; CFI; and the parsimony fit
indices AIC and BIC (see Table 3). We shall briefly discuss each
of these in turn.
First, we report the chi-squared test. This is the traditional test
used in factor analysis, and indicates the difference between the
observed and expected covariance matrices. In the chi-squared
test, good model fit is indicated by a nonsignificant result at the
level of p " .05. Unfortunately, the chi-squared test is very
sensitive to sample size, leading to problems of false-negatives in
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small sample sizes and false-positives in large sample sizes. Given
this, it is necessary to supplement the chi-squared test with the better
indices below, and while we report the chi-square test it is these other
(better) indices on which we focused when evaluating model fit.
Second, we use root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA). This an absolute measure of fit that adjusts for sample
size when chi-squared tests are used. The RMSEA yields values
ranging from 0 to 1, with smaller values indicating better fit. While
traditionally it has been suggested that an RMSEA of !.08 indi-
cates good fit, this has been revised to suggest that values closer
to !.06 are better (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and should not exceed .07
(Steiger, 2007). One of the key benefits of using RMSEA is that a
confidence interval is available for its value, and recommendations
suggest that this should be reported in addition, and that in a
well-fitting model the lower the values the better, with the upper
limit being !.08 (Hooper et al., 2008; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kenny,
2015; Steiger, 2007).
Third, we report the standardized root-mean-square residual
(SRMR), which is again an absolute measure of fit and represents
the square root of the discrepancy between the observed covari-
ance matrix and the hypothesized covariance matrix. Values range
from 0 to 1, with smaller values indicating better fit and a value
of !.08 indicating acceptable fit (Hooper et al., 2008; Hu &
Bentler, 1999; Kenny, 2015; Steiger, 2007).
Fourth, we used the comparative fit index (CFI): a relative fit
index that examines the discrepancy between the actual data and
the hypothesized model, making adjustment for the issues of
sample size that can be problematic in the chi-squared test of
model fit. CFI is one of the most popularly reported fit indices and
is least affected by sample size (Fan, Thompson, & Wang, 1999).
Like RMSEA and SRMR, CFI yields values from 0 to 1, but unlike
the others, for the CFI it is higher values that indicate better fit.
Traditionally, CFI scores of ".90 have been taken to indicate
acceptable fit, but this has since been revised to suggest that this is
too lenient and that for good fit, scores should be ".95 (Hu &
Bentler, 1999) It is this more conservative level we settled upon for
our analyses.
Fifth and sixth, when comparing the eventual models we looked
at the parsimony fit indices of the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC: Akaike, 1974) and the closely related Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC: Schwarz, 1978). These indices indicate which
model is more parsimonious, with smaller values indicating good
fit. In contrast to the other indices, there is no cut-off here, but the
recommendation is that when comparing two models, that which
produces the lowest AIC and BIC score is the better fitting model
(Hooper et al., 2008; Kenny, 2015).
Note that all of these are recommendations rather than determi-
native rules; an overall decision should be made through consid-
ering the results across the different indices. Nevertheless, we
provisionally agreed upon the following cut-off criteria as indic-
ative of adequate model fit: RMSEA ! .07, SRMR ! .08, and
CFI " .95 (Bentler, 2007; Hooper et al., 2008; Hu & Bentler,
1999; Kenny, 2015). In addition, we decided to look at the AIC
and BIC scores because even though there are no cut-off criteria,
when comparing two models one can see which has the lowest
AIC/BIC scores, thus indicating a better fit. By using such a range
of recommended fit indices, we aimed to improve confidence in
our results. We first performed the CFAs for the four above factors
individually, and then, once all items were finalized, we entered
the factors into a CFA simultaneously. We had two main aims in
our CFA analyses: to find a factor structure that would give the
best statistical fit, but also to produce a short scale.
Individual Factor CFAs
Factor 1 (‘Impartial Beneficence’). Factor 1 contained 11
items that converged around the concept of impartial beneficence,
consisting of items such as “It is morally wrong to keep money that
one doesn’t really need if one can donate it to causes that provide
effective help to those who will benefit a great deal.” The CFA for
Factor 1 with 11 items returned fit statistics that were less than
adequate and did not meet our cut-off criteria, #2(44) ! 401.518,
p " .001, CFI ! .855, RMSEA ! .092 [.08, .10], SRMR ! .059,
AIC ! 38445.33, BIC ! 38552.41. To increase factor stability, we
decided to exclude all items with factor loadings lower than .40.
As a result, item 63 (standardized factor loading ! .39) and 48
(standardized factor loading ! .39) were dropped. Dropping these
two items resulted in a 9-item solution that did fit better but which
Table 1




Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
14 .74 — — —
16 .65 — — —
17 .65 — — —
11 .61 — — —
15 .48 — — —
62 .48 — — —
77 .48 — — —
73 .47 — — —
61 .43 — — —
63 .43 — — —
48 .41 — — —
68 — .77 — —
69 — .76 — —
67 — .68 — —
72 — .67 — —
20 — .48 — —
59 — .44 — —
70 — .37 — —
52 — .36 — —
43 — .35 — —
26 — — .70 —
27 — — .63 —
2 — — .62 —
25 — — .59 —
18 — — .54 —
4 — — .54 .30
57 — — .43 —
28 — — .38 —
21 — — .34 —
23 — — .34 —
44 — — — .76
47 — — — .72
3 — — — .64
45 — — — .61
46 — — — .44
Alphas 81 79 79 79
Note. — indicates that the factor loading was " .30. EFA ! exploratory
factor analyses.
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still did not meet our cut-off criteria, #2(27) ! 258.331, p " .001,
CFI ! .889, RMSEA ! .094 [.084, .105], SRMR ! .054, AIC !
31346.90, BIC ! 31434.51. Looking over the model modification
indices, there was evidence of correlated error variances between
items 77 and 73. Both items seemed to measure rejection of the
Doctrine of Double Effect (i.e., that it can be permissible to cause
harm as a side effect but not as an intended outcome), but because
item 77 was much longer and potentially confusing, we decided to
remove item 77. The resultant modification indices showed better
fit for the 8-item solution, but again still did not meet our cut-off
Table 2
Item Labels for Final Items Used in CFA (Study 1)
Item Factor Item label
Final item
and subscale
2 3 There are some things that are simply right or wrong, no matter what the consequences.
3 4 It is sometimes acceptable to break a moral rule in order to do good.
4 3 Some moral rules should never be broken, no matter how good the consequences.
11 1 From a moral point of view, we should feel obliged to give one of our kidneys to a person with kidney failure since
we don’t need two kidneys to survive, but really only one to be healthy.
IB-1
14 1 We have a moral obligation to do everything we can to help others in need, even if this requires giving away most of
our money.
15 1 From a moral point of view, we shouldn’t act in self-defense if this would cause great harm to other innocent people.
16 1 It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t really need if one can donate it to causes that provide effective
help to those who will benefit a great deal.
IB-2
17 1 If the only way to save another person’s life during an emergency is to sacrifice one’s own leg, then one is morally
required to make this sacrifice.
IB-3
18 3 Some of society’s laws and rules should never be broken.
20 2 If the only way to ensure the overall well-being and happiness of the people is through the use of political oppression
for a short, limited period, then political oppression should be used.
IH-2
21 3 Sometimes it’s inevitable that something morally bad will occur, but it’s much worse if you’re the one who made it
happen.
23 3 Virtues like kindness and wisdom are morally important in and of themselves, whether or not they lead to good
consequences overall.
25 3 Some things are wrong because they violate human dignity, even if they would lead to better consequences.
26 3 Some things are wrong because they are contrary to nature, even if no one is harmed.
27 3 Some sexual acts and relationships are inherently wrong, even if they are consensual and nobody is harmed.
28 3 If someone is in a position of legitimate authority over us, we have a moral duty to do and respect what they say,
even if we personally think this will lead to a worse result.
43 2 Freedom has to be weighed against the public welfare: if it is necessary to restrict individuals’ freedom to promote
the greater good, then that is what should be done.
44 4 It is morally permissible to lie if doing so would help others a great deal.
45 4 It is morally wrong to lie to a person, even if it is for their own good, and will make them better off.
46 4 It is morally wrong to break promises even if this would bring about good outcomes.
47 4 It is important to be truthful as a general rule, but sometimes people have to lie to do the right thing.
48 1 It is morally wrong for you to take a high-paying job in an industry that causes some harm (such as tobacco or
petrochemical)—even if you would donate much of your earnings to an important charity that would prevent a
greater amount of harm.
52 2 If faced with the choice, it is morally better to kill a human being who is severely mentally disabled than it is to kill
a healthy chimpanzee with greater self-awareness and cognitive and emotional capacities.
IH-3
57 3 Criminals should receive the punishment they deserve—even if this will not protect the public or deter crime in the
future.
59 2 If letting an innocent person go free in some particular instance would certainly cause riots—riots that would lead to
a serious loss of life—then it is OK to send this innocent person to jail.
61 1 If someone had a choice between saving the life of their own child, versus saving the lives of three strangers’
children, it would be morally better for that person to save the three strangers’ children.
62 1 From a moral perspective, people should care about the well-being of all human beings on the planet equally; they
should not favor the well-being of people who are especially close to them either physically or emotionally.
IB-5
63 1 When trying to help suffering people, it is just as morally important to help those in a faraway country as it is to
help those suffering in your own neighborhood.
67 2 Sometimes it is morally necessary for innocent people to die as collateral damage—if more people are saved overall. IH-5
68 2 It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to helping several other innocent
people.
IH-1
69 2 It is morally right to harm a single innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to preventing harm to a
greater number of innocent people.
70 2 It is morally wrong to take advantage of someone, even if it is to help a large number of other people.
72 2 It is permissible to torture an innocent person if this would be necessary to provide information to prevent a bomb
going off that would kill hundreds of people.
IH-4
73 1 It is just as wrong to fail to help someone as it is to actively harm them yourself. IB-4
77 1 Failing to send money to a charity to save an innocent person’s life—someone you know will die without your
help—is just as morally bad an action as sending a package of poison that will directly cause that person to die.
Note. IB ! Impartial Beneficence subscale; IH ! Instrumental Harm; CFA ! confirmatory factor analysis.
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criteria, #2(20) ! 163.687, p " .001, CFI ! .919, RMSEA ! .087
[.075, .099], SRMR ! .046, AIC ! 27877.68, BIC ! 27955.55.
We next removed items 14 and 15 on theoretical grounds: item 14
was similar to, but less precise than, item 16; and item 15 was not
theoretically critical because questions about self-defense are not
central to debates about utilitarianism. After deleting these two
items, the resultant 6-item model showed better model fit but still
did not meet our cutoff criteria, #2(9) ! 83.69, p " .001, CFI !
.926, RMSEA ! .093 [.075, .112], SRMR ! .047, AIC !
21284.17, BIC ! 21342.57. Items 61 and 62 both concerned
impartiality in helping those close to us, but because item 61 had
the weakest loading and item 62 was better as an abstract statement
of impartiality, we next deleted item 61, which led to a 5-item
model with substantially improved fit, #2(5) ! 26.83, p " .001,
CFI ! .974, RMSEA ! .067 [.044, .093], SRMR ! .032, AIC !
17845.76, BIC ! 17894.43. This 5-item solution had the lowest
AIC and BIC of the models tested, and met our cut-offs for the CFI
(".95), RMSEA (!.07), and SRMR (!.08). Therefore, items 16,
17, 11, 73, and 62 were included in the final CFA for the first
construct. Because these items seemed to tap into the aspect of
utilitarianism that seeks to impartially maximize welfare and the
greater good, even at expense to oneself, we labeled this factor
Impartial Beneficence.
Factor 2 (‘Instrumental Harm’). Next, we conducted a CFA
on Factor 2. Factor 2 consisted of 9 items that seemed to tap the
construct of willingness to endorse instrumental harm, including
items such as “It is morally right to harm an innocent person if
harming them is a necessary means to helping several other inno-
cent people.” The model with all 9 items showed acceptable model
fit, but did not meet all of our cut-off criteria, #2(27) ! 149.01,
p " .001, CFI ! .940, RMSEA ! .069 [.058, .080], SRMR !
.045, AIC ! 30732.32, BIC ! 30819.92. We wanted to improve
the model fit and reduce the number of items to be more compa-
rable to the first factor, and so because item 70 had fairly low
loadings, we removed it from the next CFA to have an 8-item
solution, #2(20) ! 131.43, p " .001, CFI ! .94, RMSEA ! .076
[.064, .089], SRMR ! .048, AIC ! 27289.42, BIC ! 27367.29.
This model still did not meet our cut-off criteria. Next, we noted
that the error variance for item 59 was correlated with the error
variances of three other items (67, 20, and 52), indicating that there
was another factor that was not accounted for by our model which
explained a significant amount of variance between these three
items. To gain as clean a factor structure as possible, we next
removed item 59 from the CFA. This 7-item solution resulted in
decent model fit, #2(14) ! 70.25, p " .001, CFI ! .97, RMSEA !
.065 [.050, .080], SRMR ! .037, AIC ! 23803.09, BIC !
23871.23. However, items 43 and 20 still shared a significant
amount of error variance and so to obtain as clean a factor structure
as possible, we deleted item 43, which was theoretically less
fundamental because it referred to political restriction of freedom
rather than to causing acute harm. The resultant six-item CFA
showed good model fit, #2(9) ! 50.149, p " .001, CFI ! .976,
RMSEA ! .07 [.051, .088], SRMR ! .03, AIC ! 20362.66,
BIC ! 20421.06. We remained concerned, however, that two
items (68 and 69) in the model were too similar in both content and
language and so we next excluded the weaker loading item (item
69). This five item factor-solution showed good model fit: #2(5) !
26.870, p " .001, CFI ! .978, RMSEA ! .068 [.044, .094],
SRMR ! .031, AIC ! 17416.26, BIC ! 17464.93. Finally, we
removed item 52—the weakest loading—because it included ele-
ments relating both to instrumental harm and to impartiality and
was therefore somewhat theoretically removed from the other
items. Deleting this item resulted in a four-item solution with
excellent fit, meeting all of the recommended fit index cut-off
levels we specified before data collection (CFI " .95; RMSEA !
.07; SRMR ! .08), and having the lowest AIC and BIC of the
different solutions tested: #2(2) ! 4.47, p ! .11, CFI ! .997,
RMSEA ! .036 [.00, .08], SRMR ! .014, AIC ! 13766.89,
BIC ! 13805.82. Therefore, this four-item solution with the items
20, 67, 68, and 72 was chosen as the final solution for the second
factor. Because the second factor tapped support of allowing harm
in the service of the greater good, we labeled it Instrumental Harm.
Factor 3 (‘Anti-Traditional Morality’). Factor 3 consisted
of 10 items that were concerned with traditional morality—a set of
deontological ideas associated with conservative thought, such as
retributive punishment, sexual morality, human dignity, and an
absolutist view of social and moral rules. An example of an item
from this factor is “Criminals should receive the punishment they
deserve—even if this will not protect the public or deter crime in
the future.” The CFA for the third factor with 10 items showed
poor model fit, #2(35) ! 417.182, p " .001, CFI ! .830,
RMSEA ! .107 [.098, .116], SRMR ! .067, AIC ! 34950.38,
BIC ! 35047.72. Looking at the factor loadings, items 21 and 23
had very low factor loadings (both ! .25), and so we removed
them from the model. Removing these two items gave a 8-item
model with slightly better fit, though it was still substandard,
#
2(20) ! 252.735, p " .001, CFI ! .884, RMSEA ! .110 [.098,
.122], SRMR ! .058, AIC ! 28576.34, BIC ! 28654.21. The
modification indices highlighted a strong correlation between the
error variances for items 27 and 26, and so we decided to remove
the item with more error variance (item 26). Dropping this item
gave us a 7-item model that had better fit but still did not meet our
Table 3

















RMSEA !.07 .07 .04 .05 .07 .05 .04
SRMR !.08 .03 .01 .04 .03 .02 .04
CFI ".95 .97 .10 .97 .96 .99 .98
Note. RMSEA ! root mean square error of approximation; SRMR ! standardized root-mean-square residual; CFI ! comparative fit index; OUS-IB !
Impartial Beneficence Sub-Scale; OUS-IH ! Instrumental Harm Sub-Scale; OUS ! Oxford Utilitarianism Scale.
13BEYOND SACRIFICIAL HARM
cut-off criteria, #2(14) ! 92.073, p " .001, CFI ! .938,
RMSEA ! .076 [.062, .091], SRMR ! .041, AIC ! 25144.06,
BIC ! 25212.20. To improve fit, we next deleted item 28, which
in addition to being the lowest-loading item, also was more theo-
retically distinct by focusing more on political authority than
morality. The resulting six-item model fit the data well, #2(9) !
49.617, p " .001, CFI ! .962, RMSEA ! .069 [.051, .088],
SRMR ! .034, AIC ! 21653.56, BIC ! 21711.97. This model
consisting of items 2, 4, 18, 25, 27, and 57 met all of the recom-
mended fit index cut-off levels we specified before data collection
(CFI " .95; RMSEA ! .07; SRMR ! .08), and had the lowest
AIC and BIC of the different solutions tested. Therefore, this was
chosen as the final solution for the third factor, and because this
factor tapped the rejection of traditional deontological moralities
we labeled it Anti-Traditional Morality.
Factor 4 (‘Truth-Telling and Promise-Keeping’). Finally,
we looked at Factor 4, which consisted of 5 items concerning
truth-telling and promise keeping, such as “It is morally wrong to
break promises even if this would bring about good outcomes” and
“It is morally permissible to lie if doing so would help others a
great deal.” In addition to explaining the least variance, Factor 4
also represented a group of moral views that are not distinctive of
utilitarianism given that few hold that it is never permitted to lie or
break promises, limiting its usefulness to the scale. Nonetheless,
for completeness we again conducted a CFA. The first CFA with
all 5 items showed weak model fit, #2(5) ! 181.942, p " .001,
CFI ! .882, RMSEA ! .192 [.169, .216], SRMR ! .070, AIC !
15988.92, BIC ! 16037.59. Because item 46 was the weakest
loading and shared a lot of variance with items 45 and 47, we next
excluded this item. This four-item solution was better but still had
unacceptable model fit, #2(2) ! 30.773, p " .001, CFI ! .975,
RMSEA ! .122 [.087, .162], SRMR ! .030, AIC ! 12743.30,
BIC ! 12782.24. Given both prior theoretical concerns (that issues
relating to honesty and promise-keeping are not central, or even
particularly important, to utilitarianism) and the suboptimal results
from the CFA, we therefore decided to not include this factor in the
final scale.
Overall Factor Solutions
We first tested a three-factor solution by conducting a CFA with all
three retained factors and their corresponding manifest items entered
into the model simultaneously (Factor 1: items 11,16,17,73,62;
Factor 2: items 20,67,68,72; Factor 3: items 2,4,18,25,27,57) The
resulting model fit was acceptable, but still did not meet our cut-off
criteria, #2(87) ! 352.167, p " .001, CFI ! .913, RMSEA ! .056
[.050, .063], SRMR ! .056, AIC ! 53253.596, BIC ! 53414.205.
Given this, we compared this factor model to one where all 15
items loaded onto a single factor. This model produced a signifi-
cantly worse model fit, #2(90) ! 2256.238, p " .001, CFI ! .287,
RMSEA ! .158 [.153, .164], SRMR ! .159, AIC ! 55151.666,
BIC ! 55297.674. The one-factor model provided extremely poor
fit, empirically supporting our theoretical basis for believing that a
multifactor solution would best characterize utilitarian tendencies
in the lay population. At the same time, these results suggested that
a three-factor might not be the most appropriate multifactor solu-
tion.
Given that the three-factor solution did not meet the recom-
mended threshold (specifically for the CFI), we considered
whether a two-factor solution consisting of Impartial Beneficence
and Instrumental Harm might be more appropriate. This two-factor
model demonstrated excellent fit: #2(26) ! 84.914, p " .001,
CFI ! .967, RMSEA ! .049 [.037, .060], SRMR ! .040, AIC !
31610.403, BIC ! 31702.875 (see Table 4 for Factor Loadings
and Table 5 for Final Items). Recall that we had followed recom-
mended cut-off criteria of CFI " .95, RMSEA ! .07, SRMR !
.08, and the use of AIC and BIC to see which model had the lowest
value, thus indicating better fit (Bentler, 2007; Hooper et al., 2008;
Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kenny, 2015). Unlike the three-factor model,
the two-factor model met the CFI criterion. Moreover, compared
with a three-factor model, the two-factor model consisting of
Impartial Beneficence and Instrumental Harm had superior fit
indices across the board: it had a higher CFI (.967 vs. 913); a lower
RMSEA (.049 vs. .056); a lower SRMR (.040 vs. .056); a lower
AIC (31610.403 vs. 53253.596); and a lower BIC (31702.875 vs.
53414.205).
A two-factor model with only Impartial Beneficence and Instru-
mental Harm was clearly better than a three-factor model, but
might an alternative two-factor model be even better? We com-
pared our two-factor model consisting of Impartial Beneficence
and Instrumental Harm with two-factor models consisting of Im-
partial Beneficence and Anti-Traditional Morality, and instrumen-
tal harm and Anti-Traditional Morality. Results indicated that our
selected model consisting of Impartial Beneficence and Instrumen-
tal Harm showed better fit than the other versions. A two-factor
model consisting of Impartial Beneficence and Anti-Traditional
Morality did not meet our cut-off criteria for the CFI, and indeed
had worse fit indices across the board: #2(43) ! 159.365, p "
.001, CFI ! .941, RMSEA ! .053 [.044, .062], SRMR ! .045,
AIC ! 39493.458, BIC ! 39605.397. The same was observed for
a two-factor model consisting of Instrumental Harm and Anti-
Traditional Morality: #2(34) ! 199.499, p " .001, CFI ! .22,
RMSEA ! .071 [.062, .081], SRMR ! .062, AIC ! 35417.079,
BIC ! 35519.285.
In summary, then, the two-factor model consisting of only
Impartial Beneficence and Instrumental Harm (and not the Anti-
Traditional Morality factor) showed substantially better fit across
the different indices than a unidimensional model, a three-factor
Table 4
Factor Loadings for the Final Two-Factor CFAs in Studies 1
and 2
Item






















Note. All factor loadings are significant at the p " .001 level; CFA !
confirmatory factor analysis.
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model with all three factors, a two-factor model consisting of only
Impartial Beneficence and Anti-Traditional Morality, and a two-
factor model consisting of only Instrumental Harm and Anti-
Traditional Morality. In fact, the two-factor Impartial Beneficence
and Instrumental Harm model was the only one to meet all the
recommended fit indices we had settled on at the start of the
project based on the recent directives in the field (Bentler, 2007;
Hooper et al., 2008; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kenny, 2015).
There is therefore a strong psychometric basis for choosing a
two-factor model. Such a decision, however, can also be supported
on theoretical grounds. The Anti-Traditional Morality factor
largely taps the rejection of deontological absolutism and tradi-
tional moral rules (e.g., those relating to punishment or sexual
purity). Although such views are very distant from utilitarianism,
this is not in and of itself diagnostic for distinguishing utilitarians
from nonutilitarians. While utilitarians may have been historical
pioneers in advocating for sexual freedom and the rejection of
rigid moral norms, such moral views are today widely shared
within secular morality, including by those holding resolutely
nonutilitarian views such as libertarianism or pluralist liberal mo-
ralities focusing on rights. Contemporary defenders of Kantian
ethics also often reject an absolutist interpretation of the approach,
and dismiss Kant’s rigid views about, for example, sexuality and
suicide. A high score on the Anti-Traditional Morality factor
therefore indicates acceptance of a broadly secular morality but
does not yet amount to an interesting move in a distinctively
utilitarian direction. Indeed, the comparatively poor fit of the
three-factor solution may suggest that it is unhelpful to treat moral
absolutism as the key contrast with utilitarianism, as some previ-
ous scales do.
Study 2: Scale Validation
In Study 1 we established a provisional 2-factor Oxford Utili-
tarianism Scale (OUS). In Study 2 we sought to confirm—and if
needed, refine—this scale. To confirm the factor structure and
establish contrast validity, we recruited a new set of participants to
complete the scale and a number of theoretically related constructs.
This allowed us to perform a second CFA using the new dataset,
and to examine how well scores on the OUS related to existing
measures of utilitarianism.
Participants and Procedure
Three hundred participants were recruited online using MTurk.
Eighteen participants were excluded from analysis for answering a
simple attention check incorrectly or not completing the survey,
leaving a final sample of 282 participants (178 female, Mage ! 39,
SD ! 12.66). The majority of participants had attended college or
higher education (80%). As before, participants rated how much
they agreed or disagreed with the statements (1 ! strongly dis-
agree, 7 ! strongly agree). Participants completed the provisional
OUS first (with the Anti-Traditional Morality items, to confirm,
with a new sample, the appropriateness of excluding those items as
had been decided before) and then moved on to complete a series
of other measures. These measures were designed both to assess
construct validity and to show how the OUS can shed light on
previously found relationships between individual differences and
(so-called) utilitarianism. To prevent order effects, these other
measures were presented in a randomized order, with demographic
questions and questions on political and religious belief at the end.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Beginning by looking at the factors separately, the first factor of
Impartial Beneficence showed excellent model fit, #2(5) ! 3.754,
p ! .59, CFI ! .1.00, RMSEA ! .000 [.000, .071], SRMR ! .021,
AIC ! 5281.130, BIC ! 5317.549. Similarly, the second factor of
Instrumental Harm showed excellent fit, #2(2) ! 3.563, p ! .168,
CFI ! .994, RMSEA ! .053 [.00, .140], SRMR ! .022, AIC !
4027.463, BIC ! 4056.599. Finally, the third factor of Anti-
Traditional Morality showed weaker but acceptable fit, meeting
Table 5





item No. Final item
Impartial
Beneficence
62 IB-1 From a moral perspective, people should care about the well-being of all human beings on the planet
equally; they should not favor the well-being of people who are especially close to them either
physically or emotionally.
11 IB-2 From a moral point of view, we should feel obliged to give one of our kidneys to a person with
kidney failure since we don’t need two kidneys to survive, but really only one to be healthy.
17 IB-3 If the only way to save another person’s life during an emergency is to sacrifice one’s own leg, then
one is morally required to make this sacrifice.
73 IB-4 It is just as wrong to fail to help someone as it is to actively harm them yourself.
16 IB-5 It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t really need if one can donate it to causes that
provide effective help to those who will benefit a great deal.
Instrumental
Harm
68 IH-1 It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to helping
several other innocent people.
20 IH-2 If the only way to ensure the overall well-being and happiness of the people is through the use of
political oppression for a short, limited period, then political oppression should be used.
72 IH-3 It is permissible to torture an innocent person if this would be necessary to provide information to
prevent a bomb going off that would kill hundreds of people.
67 IH-4 Sometimes it is morally necessary for innocent people to die as collateral damage—if more people
are saved overall.
Note. IB ! Impartial Beneficence subscale; IH ! Instrumental Harm.
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the CFI and SRMR criteria, but not the RMSEA: #2(9) ! 24.549,
p ! .004, CFI ! .969, RMSEA ! .078 [.042, .116], SRMR !
.038, AIC ! 6106.079, BIC ! 6149.782.
Next, we looked at the overall factor solutions. The two-factor
CFA model selected from Study 1 with Impartial Beneficence and
Instrumental Harm showed excellent fit: #2(26) ! 39.550, p !
.043, CFI ! .975, RMSEA ! .043 [.008, .069], SRMR ! .048,
AIC ! 9302.380, BIC ! 9371.576. As in Study 1, our selected
model performed substantially better than all the other alternatives,
having superior fit across all indices and being the only one to
meet all of the recommended cut-offs. Our selected model with
Impartial Beneficence and Instrumental Harm performed better
than a one-factor model, #2(90) ! 704.826, p " .001, CFI ! .454,
RMSEA ! .156 [.145, .166], SRMR ! .154, AIC ! 15923.795,
BIC ! 16033.052; better than a three-factor model, #2(87) !
184.047, p " .001, CFI ! .914, RMSEA ! .063 [.050, .076],
SRMR ! .070, AIC ! 15409.015, BIC ! 15529.198; better than
a two-factor model with only Impartial Beneficence and Anti-
Traditional Morality, #2(43) ! 89.527, p " .001, CFI ! .942,
RMSEA ! .062 [.044, .080], SRMR ! .061, AIC ! 11387.434,
BIC ! 11471.198; and better than a two-factor model with only
Instrumental Harm and Anti-Traditional Morality, #2(34) !
91.792, p " .001, CFI ! .929, RMSEA ! .078 [.059, .097],
SRMR ! .070, AIC ! 10133.293, BIC ! 10209.773. As in Study
1, a two-factor model with Impartial Beneficence and Instrumental
Harm had better fit than all the other alternatives, and indeed was
the only one to meet all the recommended fit criteria.
The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS)
Having assessed the scale on both theoretical and empirical
grounds, we therefore arrive at a final scale consisting of 9 items
in two subscales. The first subscale—Impartial Beneficence (OUS-
IB)—consists of 5 items that all tap endorsement of the impartial
maximization of the greater good, even at the cost of personal
self-sacrifice:
1. If the only way to save another person’s life during an
emergency is to sacrifice one’s own leg, then one is
morally required to make this sacrifice.
2. From a moral point of view, we should feel obliged to
give one of our kidneys to a person with kidney failure
since we do not need two kidneys to survive, but really
only one to be healthy.
3. From a moral perspective, people should care about
the well-being of all human beings on the planet equal-
ly; they should not favor the well-being of people who
are especially close to them either physically or emo-
tionally.
4. It is just as wrong to fail to help someone as it is to
actively harm them yourself.
5. It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t
really need if one can donate it to causes that provide
effective help to those who will benefit a great deal.
The second subscale was labeled Instrumental Harm (OUS-IH).
This subscale consists of 4 items that all tap a willingness to cause
harm to bring about the greater good:
1. It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming
them is a necessary means to helping several other inno-
cent people.
2. If the only way to ensure the overall well-being and
happiness of the people is through the use of political
oppression for a short, limited period, then political op-
pression should be used.
3. It is permissible to torture an innocent person if this
would be necessary to provide information to prevent a
bomb going off that would kill hundreds of people.
4. Sometimes it is morally necessary for innocent people to
die as collateral damage—if more people are saved
overall.
Construct Validity
For the final stage of our scale development procedure, we used
the same dataset as was used for the second CFA (N ! 282) to
assess the construct validity of the OUS. Since ‘proto-utilitarian
tendencies’ is a new construct and existing measures are flawed,
there is no straightforward way to validate the scale. We decided
to assess construct validity with three key tests assessing conver-
gent validity (i.e., whether things that are theoretically connected
are in fact connected in the data). Specifically, if our OUS scale is
measuring what it should be measuring, (a) overall OUS scores
should be associated with the extent of agreement with an explicit
statement of a utilitarian approach to ethics, (b) OUS-IH scores
should be associated with prosacrifice responses in sacrificial
moral dilemmas, and (c) OUS-IB scores should be associated with
responses in ‘greater good’ moral dilemmas that capture partici-
pants’ endorsement of self-sacrifice and impartiality in morality
(see Table 6 for all Correlations). Note that our focus here is
primarily on convergent rather than divergent validity. We have of
course developed an overall OUS scale and because scores on the
two subscales are positively but weakly correlated, it would make
sense if—in addition to the primary relationship between the
OUS-IB and the ‘greater good’ dilemmas—there is also a weak
positive relationship between the OUS-IH and these dilemmas.
What is critical for our 2D model is not that there is absolutely no
Table 6
Correlations Between the OUS and Other Measures
of Utilitarianism
Measure 1 2 3
1. Overall Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) —
2. Impartial Beneficence Sub-Scale (OUS-IB) .81!! —
3. Instrumental Harm Sub-Scale (OUS-IH) .70!! .14! —
4. Explicit utilitarianism .35!! .37!! .13!
5. Classic sacrificial dilemmas $.34!! $.21!! $.32!!
6. Greater good dilemmas .40!! .50!! .07!!
! p " .01. !! p " .005.
16 KAHANE ET AL.
relationship between instrumental harm and impartial beneficence,
but that they are independent and dissociable factors.
We have focused our assessment of construct validity by com-
paring the OUS with other measures that have been claimed,
however accurately or inaccurately, to directly measure utilitari-
anism. That said, it is prudent to note that the distinction we draw
below between measures directly assessing construct validity and
those showing how the OUS works in practice could be seen as
somewhat arbitrary, given that nearly all previous psychological
work on utilitarianism has ignored impartial beneficence. Both sets
of measures are important and meaningful in confirming the
scale’s validity, but for the specific purpose of assessing construct
validity, we begin by looking at purported measures of utilitarian-
ism rather than associated constructs.
Explicit Utilitarianism
Our first key test of construct validity was to ensure that scores
on the OUS were associated with agreement of an explicitly
utilitarian moral philosophy. Participants were asked to indicate
how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statement:
The only thing that determines whether an act is morally right is
whether, out of the available options, it is the act that would lead to the
most happiness and the least suffering in the world, taking into
account the welfare of all sentient beings, whether human or animal.
An act that doesn’t maximize welfare in this way is morally wrong.
On this moral view, no one counts for more than anyone else: our own
interests and needs, and the interests and needs of our family and
friends, never count for more than the interests and needs of any other
person, however distant from us. Finally, on this view the only thing
that matters is how our actions affect the amount of happiness in the
world. It is always morally right to break a rule or principle if doing
so would lead to the better outcome.
Note that this explicit description of utilitarianism is well-
grounded theoretically and the one that we took as our standard
when developing this scale and thus, to the extent that scores on
the OUS reflect endorsement of specifically utilitarian moral
thinking, they should correlate positively with agreement with this
statement of explicit utilitarianism. This was the case. Agreement
with the statement of explicit utilitarianism was associated with
higher scores on the OUS overall, r ! .35, p " .001, and for each
of the two subscales: the Impartial Beneficence subscale, r ! .37,
p " .001 and, more weakly, the Instrumental Harm subscale, r !
.16, p " .001. A test of significance between these two correlations
(Steiger, 1980) showed that these correlations were significantly
different (Z ! 2.84, p ! .005), providing empirical support for our
theoretically grounded claim that it is impartial beneficence rather
than instrumental harm that is at the core of a distinctively utili-
tarian outlook.7
Sacrificial Moral Dilemmas
As just described, our first key test was to look at how overall
OUS scores were associated with a statement of explicit utilitari-
anism. Our next two tests were focused more on providing con-
vergent validity for the two subscales in isolation, starting with
responses to ‘trolley-style’ sacrificial moral dilemmas. Although
there are serious concerns about identifying utilitarian judgments
with prosacrifice judgments in such dilemmas (Kahane, 2015),
such sacrificial dilemmas do seem to track the endorsement of
instrumental harm. To the extent that our Instrumental Harm
subscale directly measures this negative component of utilitarian-
ism—a willingness to cause harm for the greater good—there
should be a significant, positive association between scores on the
overall OUS (likely driven by the OUS-IH) and endorsement of
the sacrificial action in these trolley-style sacrificial dilemmas.
To assess the convergent validity of the OUS through the
association with sacrificial dilemmas, we used three dilemmas
involving ‘up-close-and personal’ harm that were adapted from
previous research (Moore et al., 2008). The dilemmas we used
included, and were inspired by, the classic Footbridge case, in
which one can save five people from a runaway trolley only by
pushing another person onto the tracks, leading to that person’s
death (see Supplemental Materials for a full description). For each
of the three dilemmas, participants were asked “How wrong would
it be to [perform the ‘utilitarian’ act, for example, push the stranger
in the Footbridge case]?” (1 ! not at all wrong, 7 ! extremely
wrong). These ratings across the three dilemmas were combined
into a single reliable measure of participants’ ‘utilitarianism’ (viz.,
endorsement of instrumental harm) in sacrificial dilemmas (% !
.74), where lower scores indicated higher ‘utilitarianism.’ Con-
firming the validity of the OUS, participants who scored higher on
the OUS-IH subscale, r ! $.32, p " .001 and the OUS overall,
r ! $.34, p " .001 were more likely to endorse the sacrifice in
these dilemmas.
Recall that our focus here was on the convergent validity of the
OUS-IH subscale with responses in sacrificial dilemmas, because
the OUS-IH is supposed to measure instrumental harm and this is
also measured in sacrificial dilemmas. It was less important, but
nonetheless interesting, to determine if scores on the OUS-IB were
associated (positively or negatively) with responses to these di-
lemmas. We approached this question in two ways. First, we looked
at the correlations between the sacrificial dilemmas and the OUS-IB
and found that participants who scored higher on the OUS-IB were
also—perhaps surprisingly—more likely to endorse the sacrificial
option in the dilemmas, r ! $.21, p " .001. The strengths of
correlations between the dilemmas and the two subscales were not
significantly different (Z ! $1.48, p ! .14). Second, we looked at
wrongness ratings for the sacrificial action in the dilemmas by
categorizing participants based on whether they were high (i.e.,
above the scale midpoint) or low (i.e., below the scale midpoint)
on both, either, or neither, of the two OUS subscales. To do this we
coded participants based on whether they were above or below the
midpoint on each of the scales separately, and then entered this
into a 2 (OUS-IB: Low vs. High) & 2 (OUS-IH: Low vs. High)
7 Although the OUS scores correlated well with an explicit statement of
utilitarianism, it is also worth highlighting at this junction that we would
not recommend using such an explicit statement of utilitarianism as an
independent measure of utilitarian tendencies. First, the explicit description
does not completely distinguish between the positive and negative com-
ponents of utilitarianism. Second, and relatedly, although OUS scores
correlated well with the explicit statement, this was far from a perfect
correlation, and OUS scores often had stronger correlations with the other
measures than did the explicit statement. For example, as reported below,
scores on the OUS-IB had a much stronger correlation with perceptions of
wrongness on the greater good dilemmas from Kahane et al. 2015; dis-
cussed below: r ! .50, p " .001), whereas the correlation with the explicit
statement of utilitarianism was substantially weaker, r ! .27, p " .001.
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between-subjects ANOVA. For convenience we shall call partic-
ipants who scored high on both subscales “utilitarians” (N ! 50),
and those who scored low on both subscales “deontologists” (N !
118). Those who scored high on Impartial Beneficence but low on
Instrumental Harm are referred as “impartials” (N ! 67), and those
who scored high on Instrumental Harm but low on Impartial
Beneficence as “instrumentalists” (N ! 47). Note that these labels
are simply intended to make the following results more easily
interpretable for the reader, and should not be taken as firm
categorizations. We observed a main effect on wrongness by
whether participants were above or below the midpoint on the
OUS-IH, F(1, 278) ! 23.64, p " .001, '2 ! .08, and a (weaker)
main effect based on the OUS-IB, F(1, 278) ! 4.30, p ! .04, '2 !
.02, but no interaction between OUS-IB and OUS-IH, F(1, 278) !
0.17, p ! .68, '2 ! .00. “Utilitarians” (i.e., those high on both IB
and IH) thought the sacrifice to be the least wrong of all four
groups, regarding it as significantly less wrong than “impartialists”
(i.e., those high only on IB but low on IH; p ! .01), and “deon-
tologists” (those low on both IB and IH; p " .001). There was no
difference between “utilitarians” and “instrumentalists” (p ! .73).
Deontologists (low on both IB and IH) thought the sacrifice to be
most wrong, significantly more so than utilitarians (p " .001),
impartialists (p ! .04), and instrumentalists (p " .001). Overall,
then, both Impartial Beneficence and Instrumental Harm were
associated with thinking the sacrificial action to be less wrong, but
unsurprisingly this was stronger for Instrumental harm. While
there was no significant interaction between the two dimensions, it
is noteworthy that utilitarians high on both dimensions thought the
sacrifice to be the least wrong, and deontologists low on both
dimensions thought it to be the most wrong.
The significant association we observed between prosacrifice
judgments and the OUS-IB (even if weaker than the association
with the OUS-IH) is somewhat puzzling given that that in some of
our previous work (Kahane et al., 2015) we found no relation
between such judgments and a battery of ‘greater good’ dilemmas,
a vignette-based measure of the ‘positive’ dimension of utilitari-
anism (see below). One possibility is that the first-person presen-
tation of the dilemmas in the previous study (e.g., ‘should you push
the man?’) had something to do with the observed difference, since
for consistency all dilemmas here were presented in the third-
person form (e.g., ‘should Adam push the man?’). Further research
is required to assess such possibilities.
‘Greater Good’ Moral Dilemmas
Our final key test of construct validity was to establish the
convergence between OUS-IB and overall OUS scores with re-
sponses to dilemmas tapping participants’ endorsement of self-
sacrifice and impartiality in morality. To accomplish this, we used
three ‘greater good’ dilemmas designed by Kahane et al. (2015) to
directly pit an explicit utilitarian action promoting the greater good
against a narrower, more partial moral view that allows us to give
priority to self, family, and country. For each item participants
were asked to rate how wrong it would be for someone to perform
the non-utilitarian action (1 ! not at all wrong; 7 ! very wrong),
such that higher scores indicated greater utilitarianism (in contrast
to the sacrificial dilemmas). Confirming our construct validity,
endorsement of the utilitarian action in these greater good dilem-
mas was significantly associated with scores on the OUS-IB sub-
scale, r ! .50, p " .001 and with OUS scores overall, r ! .40, p "
001.
We also looked at the correlation between responses to the
greater good dilemmas and the other subscale, OUS-IH. Interest-
ingly, there was no relationship between scores on the OUS-IH,
r ! .07, p ! .26 and responses to the greater good dilemmas, and
the correlations between the OUS-IB and OUS-IH with the dilem-
mas were significantly different (Z ! 6.04, p " .001). Similar
results were observed when looking at perceived wrongness of the
nonutilitarian act in the greater good dilemmas based on whether
participants were high (i.e., above the scale midpoint) or low (i.e.,
below the scale midpoint) on both, either, or neither, of the two
subscales. We observed a main effect on wrongness by whether
participants were above or below the midpoint on the OUS-IB,
F(1, 278) ! 34.78, p " .001, '2 ! .11, but no significant effect of
the OUS-IH, F(1, 278) ! 3.16, p ! .08, '2 ! .01, and no
interaction between OUS-IB and OUS-IH, F(1, 278) ! 0.43, p !
.51, '2 ! .00. “Utilitarians” (high on both IB and IH) thought that
failing to perform the utilitarian action was the most wrong of all
four groups, thinking it significantly more wrong than “instrumen-
talists” (high on IH but low on IB; p " .001), and “deontologists”
(low on both IB and IH; p " .001). Similarly, “impartialists” (high
on IB but low on IH) thought that failing to perform the utilitarian
action was more wrong than instrumentalists (p ! .006) and
deontologists (p " .001); but there was no difference between
utilitarians and impartialists (p ! .10), nor between impartialists
and deontologists (p ! .41). Higher levels of impartial beneficence
were associated with more characteristically utilitarian responses
in the greater good dilemmas, but this was independent of endorse-
ment of instrumental harm. Overall, then, results from both cor-
relational analyses and an ANOVA revealed that while sacrificial
judgments were correlated with scores on the OUS-IB, more
concrete cases of impartial beneficence were not associated with
instrumental harm. These results again highlight that while there is
a connection between the utilitarian components of instrumental
harm and impartial beneficence, they appear to have relatively
distinct psychological correlates.
Finally, it is important to note that of the 5 items in the OUS-IB
subscale, 3 are concerned with self-sacrifice for the greater good
(1, 2, 5), one with impartiality with respect to strangers versus
those close to you (3), and one with the act/omission distinction
(4). The three greater good dilemmas we used here covered self-
sacrifice to aid distant strangers, self-sacrifice to prevent harm to
animals, and refusal to give priority to one’s own country in the
context of charitable donation. The OUS-IB subscale was signif-
icantly correlated with all 3 dilemmas (rs ( .31, ps " .001),
suggesting that it measures both the element of self-sacrifice and
the rejection of special duties to those closely associated with you.
Study 3: Expert Validation
In Study 2, we established construct validity by showing that
both the OUS overall and its two subscales were strongly corre-
lated with the degree to which participants endorsed an explicit
statement of utilitarianism and that each of the subscales was
associated in the appropriate direction with more specific measures
of the positive and negative dimensions of utilitarianism (e.g., the
OUS-IH with prosacrifice responses to sacrificial dilemmas and
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the OUS-IB with more impartial responses in the greater good
dilemmas).
To provide further validation of the construct, we compared
OUS scores with the self-reported moral views of experts in moral
philosophy. To the extent that the OUS is a reliable measure of
utilitarian tendencies, it should strongly correlate with the degree
to which such experts self-identify as utilitarian. Notice, however,
that the OUS was designed as a measure of the moral outlook of
ordinary people, not as a tool enabling fine-grained classification
of the ethical views of moral philosophers.
Collecting responses from experts also allowed us to investigate
another question. While both the OUS-IB and OUS-IH were
strongly correlated with explicit endorsement of utilitarianism (r !
.81 and r ! .70, respectively), they were only weakly associated
with each other (r ! .14), supporting our hypothesis that these two
dimensions of utilitarianism are nevertheless independent factors
in the psychology of ordinary people. This independence might
raise questions about the rationale for including both dimensions in
a single scale. However, the conceptual unity of the scale would be
demonstrated if the two dimensions were closely linked in expert
moral philosophers who either explicitly endorse or reject utilitar-
ianism. We predicted that the two subscales would be strongly
correlated in a sample of expert moral philosophers.
Method
Participants. Our sample of experts in moral philosophy were
recruited through an email sent to the following mail-lists associ-
ated with ethics and moral philosophy: the Future of Humanity
Institute, the Centre for Effective Altruism, the Ethox Centre, and
the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford;
the Anscombe Bioethics Centre for Medical Ethics; the Bioethics
Centre at Monash University; The Hastings Center (bioethics
research institute); the Yeoh Tiong Lay Centre for Politics, Phi-
losophy & Law at King’s College London; and BioEdge.org.
These groups were purposely selected to consist of people who
work extensively on questions of ethics and moral philosophy, and
care was taken to include both utilitarian-leaning groups (e.g., the
Future of Humanity Institute and the Centre for Effective Altru-
ism) and antiutilitarian-leaning groups (e.g., the conservative
Anscombe Bioethics Centre and Bioedge.org), as well as groups
that focus more on the applied aspects of moral philosophy (e.g.,
The Hastings Center and Yeoh Tiong Lay Centre). Participants
completed the survey online via an electronic link sent in the
email. Participants were not personally paid for taking part but
instead had the option to register an email address to enter a
charity-raffle. For every person that completed the survey we put
£2 (approx $2.50 USD) into a pot to be donated to charity, and at
the end of data collection we randomly selected one response and
asked the winner which charity we should donate to from the
following list: Against Malaria Foundation (AMF), Royal Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA); Schistosomi-
asis Control Initiative (SCI); Cancer Research U.K.; British Heart
Foundation; the Red Cross; and Doctors without Borders. The
winner chose the Against Malaria Foundation, and we accordingly
donated £172 (£2 & 86 participants).
Of the 86 participants who completed the survey in full, five
participants were excluded from data analysis because they were
undergraduate students. Thus, our final sample consisted of 81
experts in moral philosophy (23 female, Mage ! 32, SD ! 9.72).
Around half of our sample were graduate students (56%), followed
by postdoctoral researchers (17%), lecturers/associate professors
(14%), and full professors (6%). Participants had spent an average
of 8 years (including graduate studies) working in moral philoso-
phy (M ! 7.65, SD ! 8.17).
Measures. In this study, participants completed the 9-item
Oxford Utilitarianism Scale before rating their own self-reported
utilitarianism and indicating their own ethical views (see below).
Finally, participants indicated their gender and age, their status in
the university (graduate student; postdoctoral researcher; lecturer/
associate professor; full professor) and how many years they had
spent in professional philosophy.
Own ethical view. Participants were asked to indicate which
of a list of 10 common ethical systems was closest to their own
ethical view (act utilitarianism; rule utilitarianism; other form of
utilitarianism; nonutilitarian consequentialism; Kantian ethics;
other forms of deontology; virtue ethics; care ethics; religious
ethics; common-sense morality; non-Western ethical view; or
‘other’). We noted that perhaps none of these would perfectly
describe participants’ views, but asked them to indicate which one
was the closest.
Self-report utilitarianism. To assess how utilitarian our expert
participants judged themselves to be, we asked participants to read
the following description and rate how utilitarian they were on a
1–10 scale:
We would like you to tell us to what extent you consider your ethical
views to be close to or far from utilitarianism. Since ‘utilitarianism’
can mean different things and since there are many ways in which one
might reject utilitarianism, let us explain what exactly we mean by this
question. By ‘utilitarianism’ we mean unadorned, classical act utili-
tarianism: roughly, the view that an act is right if and only if it
maximizes aggregate welfare from a thoroughly impartial standpoint.
So for our purposes views are more utilitarian the closer they are to
this view, less utilitarian the further they are from this view. If you are
an unqualified act utilitarian then you count as maximally utilitarian
on this scale. If you are a rule utilitarian or a consequentialist whose
axiology includes more than welfare then you are somewhat less
utilitarian. Moving further away from the top end of the scale, the
more a person thinks of morality in partial terms, and the more (and
the stronger the) deontological constraints they accept, the less ‘util-
itarian’ they count on our measure. If you are attracted to W. D.
Ross’s pluralist deontological theory you would rank low on this
scale. If you hold an absolutist Kantian theory which gives limited
weight to consequences, or a highly traditional moral view, then you
should rank at the very bottom of the scale. Please indicate where you
yourself fall on this dimension, where 10 indicates that you fully
endorse classical utilitarianism and 1 indicates that your view is as far
as can be from such a utilitarian view. (e.g., you hold very strong
deontological views)
Results
The primary aim of this study was simple: to see whether, for
our expert participants who were well-versed in moral philosophy,
scores on the OUS would be positively correlated with their own
self-reported utilitarianism. Indeed, this is what we found: partic-
ipants who rated themselves as being more utilitarian on the
explicit self-report item also scored higher on the OUS. Partici-
pants’ self-reported explicit utilitarianism was significantly corre-
lated with scores on the OUS-IB, r ! .73, p " .001, OUS-IH, r !
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.69, p " .001, and overall OUS scores, r ! .76, p " .001. To probe
and confirm this primary analysis, we subsequently looked at how
participant’s self-reported ethical view (e.g., act utilitarianism,
Kantian ethics, etc.) was associated with OUS scores, and con-
ducted analyses controlling for participants’ expertise level.
Across all additional analyses the same pattern was observed:
self-described utilitarian tendencies were significantly associated
with scores on the OUS.
First, we looked at OUS scores as a function of the ethical view
that our expert participants said characterized their own view (see
Figure 1). Participants who described themselves as believing most
in “act utilitarianism” (N ! 11) scored significantly higher on the
OUS than those who described themselves as endorsing “other
forms of deontology” (N ! 18): on the OUS-IB, t(14.93) ! 6.06,
p " .001, the OUS-IH, t(27) ! 6.29, p " .001, and overall,
t(14.09) ! 6.56, p " .001. Similarly, participants who described
themselves as some kind of utilitarian (act, rule, or other: N ! 19)
scored higher than everyone else (N ! 58): on the OUS-IB,
t(75) ! 5.36, p " .001, the OUS-IH, t(75) ! 5.30, p " .001, and
overall, t(75) ! 5.81, p " .001. And looking just at those people
who described themselves as some kind of consequentialist (util-
itarian or nonutilitarian: N ! 36), scores were higher than those
endorsing deontological ethics (Kantian or other form of deontol-
ogy: N ! 22): on the OUS-IB, t(55.68) ! 5.83, p " .001, the
OUS-IH, t(56) ! 5.10, p " .001, and overall, t(55.98) ! 6.29, p "
.001. Across the two measures, then, expert participants who
reported being more utilitarian scored higher on the OUS. Such
results provide strong face validity for our claims: although the
OUS is not designed specifically for those with substantial expe-
rience with the theory of utilitarianism (one does not need a scale
to measure such an expert’s view—you can just ask them!), it was
important that differences in the OUS mirrored the self-reported
moral views of experts. If a Kantian and a utilitarian scored
similarly on the OUS, it would be a rather odd tool with which to
assess lay utilitarian tendencies. This, however, was far from being
the case. Those who described themselves as utilitarians scored
significantly higher on the OUS than those who did not.
Second, we looked at whether results were robust to controlling
for years spent in philosophy as a proxy for expertise-level within
our expert panel. Partial correlations showed that self-reported
explicit utilitarianism was significantly correlated with scores on
the OUS when statistically controlling for years spent in philoso-
phy: on the OUS-IB, r ! .72, p " .001, OUS-IH, r ! .69, p "
.001, and overall, r ! .76, p " .001. When looking only at
graduate students (N ! 45), self-reported explicit utilitarianism
was again significantly correlated with scores on the OUS-IB, r !
.70, p " .001, OUS-IH, r ! .66, p " .001, and overall OUS scores,
r ! .73, p " .001. When looking only at those at the postdoctoral
level or higher, the same pattern was seen but with slightly higher
correlations: on the OUS-IB, r ! .77, p " .001, OUS-IH, r ! .73,
p " .001, and overall OUS scores, r ! .80, p " .001. Similarly,
when looking at graduates versus postdoctoral researchers or
higher, an identical pattern of results was observed when looking
at the effects of self-described ethical view on OUS scores.
Turning next to the question of the relation between OUS-IB
and OUS-IH, our prediction that these would be more strongly
correlated in an expert sample was confirmed (r ! .75, p " .001
in the expert sample compared with r ! .14, p ! .02 in the lay
sample of Study 2, with these being significantly different, Z !
6.5, p " .001). This association was not lower in the graduate
group (r ! .74, p " .001) compared with the postgraduate one
(r ! .78, p " .001; Z ! $.04, p ! .68). There was no relationship
between years spent in philosophy and scores on the OUS overall,
r ! .14, p ! .23, the OUS-IB, r ! .08, p ! .47, or the OUS-IH,
r ! .17, p ! .13. Correspondingly, the positive relationship
between OUS-IB and OUS-IH was robust to controlling for years
spent in philosophy, r ! .75, p " .001.
The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale in practice. Having estab-
lished and validated our new Oxford Utilitarianism Scale, we next
looked at how the OUS could be used in practice. Specifically, we
sought to explore whether the OUS would shed further light on
how utilitarian tendencies are associated with individual differ-
ences (e.g., psychopathy), moral attitudes (e.g., prosocial inten-
tions), and ideological factors (e.g., religious belief). In doing so
we show that the OUS will be a valuable tool for researchers
working in moral psychology, demonstrating how previous work
exploring utilitarian tendencies has been limited by a failure to
take into account the ways in which the two core aspects of
utilitarianism—impartial beneficence and instrumental harm—
have separate and divergent influences on moral cognition. By
using the OUS we can clarify and extend the relationship between
utilitarianism and other constructs.
To look at these issues, we used the same dataset as that used in
Study 2 for assessing construct validity in a lay population. As
Figure 1. Scores on the OUS as a function of the expert’s self-described ethical view.
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noted above, this dataset consisted of 282 participants recruited
from MTurk (178 female, Mage ! 39, SD ! 12.66), of whom the
majority had attended college or higher education (80%). For all of
the subsequent discussion, the reader can refer to Table 7 for
correlations and to Table 8 for full Ms and SDs. In the Supple-
mental Materials we report results with other noncentral measures
we have omitted here in the interests of space, and further analyses
(like those conducted to assess construct validity) looking at pat-
terns of individual differences based on whether the participant
was high (i.e., above the scale midpoint) or low (i.e., below the
scale midpoint) on both, either, or neither, of the two subscales.
Supporting our 2D model, we saw few distinctive patterns of fully
utilitarian individuals who scored high on both subscales: for the
individual difference measures associated more with the OUS-IB
(e.g., empathic concern, identification with all humanity), high-
scoring individuals had higher scores on the associated measures,
independent of how they scored on the other subscale; and the
same pattern was observed for the OUS-IH and the individual
differences measures associated with that (e.g., psychopathy).
We wish again to highlight before proceeding further that scores
on the OUS-IB and OUS-IH were only weakly correlated (Study 1,
r ! .04, p ! .22; Study 2, r ! .14, p ! .02). Moreover, relatively
few people in our sample can be characterized as having a genuine
overall utilitarian tendency. On the 1–7 scale, the mean overall
OUS score was below the midpoint (Study 1, M ! 3.58, SD !
0.86; Study 2, M ! 3.50, SD ! 0.92), with slighter higher average
scores on the IB subscale (Study 1, M ! 3.75, SD ! 1.15; Study
2, M ! 3.65, SD ! 1.20) than the IH (Study 1, M ! 3.37, SD !
1.24; Study 2, M ! 3.31, SD ! 1.22). Only a quarter of partici-
pants (Study 1, 28%; Study 2, 26%) scored above the midpoint of
the scale ((4), and this was again higher for the IB (Study 1, 39%;
Study 2, 35%) than the IH (Study 1, 27%; Study 2, 24%). This
indicates that only a minority of lay people have significant proto-
utilitarian leanings. And if we consider a more robust indicator of
significant proto-utilitarian tendencies—people who scored at 5 or
above on the scale—only 5% in Study 1 and 4% in Study 2 could
be classified as significantly utilitarian overall, with this being
higher for the IB (Study 1 and Study 2, 16%) than the IH (Study
1, 9%; Study 2, 5%). While there is, then, a distribution of
utilitarian tendencies among the population, the prevalence of
people who can meaningfully be characterized as having a mod-
erate to strong utilitarian tendency should not be overstated. Be-
fitting its status as a radically demanding and counterintuitive
moral philosophy, few laypeople even approximate the views of
genuine utilitarians. This is an issue to which we return in our
discussion.
Personality and individual differences.
Psychopathy. A growing body of research has shown a rela-
tionship between subclinical psychopathy and ‘utilitarian’ judg-
ment in sacrificial dilemmas, whereby ‘utilitarian’ judgments are
associated with higher levels of both clinical (Koenigs, Kruepke,
Zeier, & Newman, 2012) and subclinical psychopathy and related
antisocial traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Kahane et al., 2015;
Koenigs et al., 2012; Wiech et al., 2013). Recent work suggests,
however, that this association may be an artifact of the use of
sacrificial moral dilemmas as the measure of utilitarianism: al-
though psychopathy is associated positively with a willingness to
personally harm others for the greater good, it is associated neg-
atively with endorsement of moral self-sacrifice (Kahane et al.,
2015). We predicted, therefore, that although overall OUS scores
might be positively associated with psychopathy, this pattern
would be driven by the OUS-IH subscale and that there would be
either be no relationship, or a negative one, between psychopathy
and the OUS-IB subscale. We measured psychopathy using Lev-
enson’s primary psychopathy subscale (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitz-
patrick, 1995), which consists of 16 items including “Success is
based on survival of the fittest; I am not concerned about the
losers” (% ! .89). Supporting predictions, overall OUS scores
were not significantly associated with primary psychopathy, r !
.11, p ! .07—however, note the p value of .07, which could
suggest a weak relationship—and neither were scores on the
OUS-IB subscale, r ! .09, p ! .13. Higher scores on the OUS-IH,
however, were significantly associated with increased psychopa-
thy, r ! .30, p " .001, and the strength of correlation between
psychopathy and the OUS-IB and OUS-IH was significantly dif-
ferent (Z ! $2.77, p ! .01).
Empathic concern. What is the relationship between em-
pathic concern and utilitarian tendencies? Some work has sug-
gested that deontological—but not utilitarian—tendencies are re-
lated to increased empathic concern (Choe & Min, 2011; Conway
Table 7
Correlations Between the OUS and Related Individual
Differences Measures
Measure 1 2 3
1. Overall Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) —
2. Impartial Beneficence Sub-Scale (OUS-IB) .81!! —
3. Instrumental Harm Sub-Scale (OUS-IH) .70!! .14! —
4. Psychopathy .11 $.09 .30!!
5. Empathic concern .14! .33!! $.16!!
6. Identification with all of humanity .13!! .33!! $.19!!
7. Need for cognition .02 .06 $.03
7. Hypothetical donation .31!! .40!! .03
8. Environmental protection $.03 .14! $.21!!
9. Economic conservatism .02 $.12 .18!!
10. Social conservatism .06 $.06 .18!!
11. Religiosity .15! .15! .06
! p " .01. !! p " .005.
Table 8




Overall Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) 1–7 3.50 .92
Impartial Beneficence Sub-Scale (OUS-IB) 1–7 3.65 1.20
Instrumental Harm Sub-Scale (OUS-IH) 1–7 3.31 1.22
Explicit utilitarianism 1–5 2.99 1.04
Classic sacrificial dilemmas 1–7 5.19 1.36
Greater good dilemmas 1–7 2.34 1.09
Psychopathy 1–4 1.76 .47
Empathic concern 1–5 4.02 .80
Need for cognition 1–5 3.39 .71
Hypothetical donation 0–100 31.56 25.59
Environmental protection 1–7 5.87 1.16
Religiosity 1–5 2.68 1.27
Economic conservatism 1–7 3.77 1.77
Religiosity 1–5 2.68 1.27
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& Gawronski, 2013; Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013; Patil & Silani,
2014). Yet on theoretical grounds, such findings are puzzling,
given that empathy has been claimed to be a central psychological
source of utilitarianism (Hare, 1981; Smart & Williams, 1973).
However, once we take into account that these prior studies all
used sacrificial dilemmas as a measure of utilitarianism, the dis-
crepancy can be explained. Such dilemmas focus exclusively on
the negative dimension of utilitarianism, and specifically on will-
ingness to cause harm for the greater good. If one considers killing
one person to save five others, a stronger empathetic response is
likely to be an obstacle to endorsing such instrumental harm. By
contrast, the historical tie between utilitarianism and empathy is
most plausibly related to utilitarianism’s positive aspect, that is, its
impartial concern for everyone’s welfare. It is therefore likely that
the previously found negative relationship between empathic con-
cern and utilitarianism may have been driven entirely by instru-
mental harm, rather than impartial beneficence.
To explore this question we looked at the relationship between
scores on the OUS and empathic concern. We used the Empathic
Concern subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davies,
1980), which measures sympathy and concern for others and
consists of 7 items including “When I see someone being taken
advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them” (% ! .90).
Given the strong conceptual (and empirical) negative relationship
between psychopathy and empathic concern (here: r ! $.59, p "
.001), our predictions mirrored those reported above for psychop-
athy. Specifically, we again predicted that although overall OUS
scores might be negatively associated with empathic concern, this
pattern would be driven by the OUS-IH subscale and that there
would be a positive relationship between empathic concern and the
OUS-IB subscale.
There was an overall positive relationship between OUS scores
and empathic concern, r ! .14, p ! .02, and while both OUS
subscales were significantly correlated with empathic concern,
these correlations were in opposite directions. While increased
empathic concern was associated with scores on the OUS-IB
subscale, r ! .33, p " .001, decreased empathic concern was
associated with the OUS-IH, r ! $.16, p ! .006; these correla-
tions were significantly different (Z ! 2.28, p ! .03). Thus,
although people who feel greater empathic concern care more
about impartially maximizing welfare, they are also less likely to
endorse instrumental harm to achieve those ends. In other words,
as suggested by Kahane et al. (2015), the negative utilitarian
tendency to endorse harm as a means to the greater good might
stand in opposition to the positive utilitarian tendency to self-
sacrifice and impartially maximizing happiness. Again, at a phil-
osophical level, the aspects of impartial beneficence and instru-
mental harm are consistent, but at a psychological level these
factors appear to have distinct antecedents and consequences on
cognition.
Identification with all of humanity. We next looked at how
OUS scores were associated with scores on the Identification with
All Humanity Scale (IWAH): a measure of the extent to which
people identify with humanity as a whole, rather than exhibit more
parochial attachment to one’s own community or country
(McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012). The extent to which an
individual identifies with the whole of humanity is best seen as an
affective disposition rather than a moral view. However, such
an all-encompassing impartial concern is often claimed to be a
core feature of classical utilitarianism (Hare, 1981; Smart, 1956).
For this reason, we predicted that IWAH would be positively
related to the Impartial Beneficence subscale, but unrelated (or
even negatively related) with the Instrumental Harm subscale.
The IWAH Scale was taken from McFarland et al. (2012) and
consisted of 9 questions. Participants were required to rate, for
people in their community, people in their country, and people all
over the world, “How close do you feel to each of the following
groups?” In analyzing results, the procedure advised by McFarland
et al. was used, regressing the raw scores to give a more accurate
representation of the variance in identification with all of human-
ity, whereby higher scores indicate greater identification with all of
humanity.
As predicted, IWAH was significantly associated with OUS
scores overall, r ! .13, p ! .03, but this was driven in opposite
directions by the OUS-IB, r ! .33, p " .001 and OUS-IH,
r ! $.19, p " .001, with these correlations being significantly
different (Z ! 6.94, p " .001). Therefore, greater impartial benef-
icence was associated with greater identification with all of hu-
manity, but greater instrumental harm was associated with less
identification with all of humanity.
Need for cognition. It has been argued that utilitarian
decision-making is uniquely based on effortful conscious rea-
soning (as opposed to immediate emotional responses) and that
utilitarian inclinations are uniquely associated with a need for
cognition (Conway & Gawronski, 2013), the motivational ten-
dency to engage in effortful thinking (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao,
1984). Indeed, the tendency for an individual to engage in and
enjoy thinking seems intuitively related to utilitarianism to the
extent that utilitarian decision-making involves the rational
weighing of different consequences and the rejection of sim-
pler, more intuitive solutions to moral problems. It has also
often been claimed that greater reliance on reason was the
source of the historical emergence of utilitarianism, and gener-
ally of more impartial and inclusive moral views (Pinker, 2011;
Singer, 2011). The extent to which need for cognition might
have divergent relations with the twin factors of impartial
beneficence and instrumental harm, though, remains unclear.
To explore this question with the OUS, we had participants
complete the 18-item Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo et al.,
1984), in which participants rate how characteristic or unchar-
acteristic certain statements are of them, such as “I would prefer
complex to simple problems” (1 ! extremely uncharacteristic
of me; 7 ! extremely characteristic of me).
In contrast to some previous research, there was no relationship
between need for cognition and OUS scores: not overall, r ! .02,
p ! .73, for the OUS-IB, r ! .06, p ! .35 or for the OUS-IH
separately, r ! $.03, p ! .57. And interestingly, there was no
association between need for cognition and other relevant mea-
sures, such as Robinson’s utilitarianism scale, r ! $.09, p ! .13
or sacrificial moral dilemmas, r ! $.04, p ! .46. It is worth
noting, however, that need for cognition is a measure of motivation
to engage in effortful deliberation. It cannot be ruled out at this
stage that the OUS subscales are associated with other indicators
of effortful cognition.
Moral attitudes.
Hypothetical donation. Present-day utilitarianism is com-
monly associated with movements to encourage more charitable
donations to strangers in need in developing countries (MacAskill,
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2015; Singer, 2015). On utilitarian grounds, donating to effective
charities like those in the developing world is not just morally
praiseworthy, but actually morally required: we ought to give the
money away, and it is wrong not to do so (Singer, 1972). We
therefore next looked at how participants’ self-reported tendency
to engage in altruistic behavior would be associated with scores on
the OUS. To the extent that the OUS measures utilitarianism, it
should be positively correlated with a self-reported intention to
perform effective charity. To investigate this we used a measure
taken from Kahane et al. (2015) where participants were told to:
Imagine that you have just received a bonus at work of $100. Your
company, however, has a policy for all staff members that they can
either take this bonus money of $100 for themselves with no penalties,
or choose to donate it to a respected charity that helps people in the
Third World. You can choose to keep or donate as much of the bonus
as you wish. If you choose to donate the bonus, the company will
double what you put in: if you donate $50 then the company will
donate $100, and if you donate $100 the company will donate $200.
This choice is made using an anonymized online system, so no one in
the company will know what you decided to do.
Participants then rated how much of the bonus they would
donate to charity on a scale of $0 to $100. Perhaps unsurprisingly
given the importance of charity to contemporary utilitarian
thought, overall OUS scores were positively associated with larger
hypothetical donations, r ! .31, p " .001. This overall correlation
was, however, driven entirely by the Impartial Beneficence sub-
scale, r ! .40, p " .001, with no relationship between hypothetical
donations and endorsement of instrumental harm, r ! .03, p ! .62.
The strengths of these correlations were, again, significantly dif-
ferent (Z ! 5.00, p " .001). It is worth noting that the measure
here is strictly a hypothetical one, with no actual cost to partici-
pants for making the altruistic decision. And yet people who are
higher in the endorsement of instrumental harm still do not even
hypothetically donate more. This result would be surprising if
utilitarianism reflected a unitary psychological construct, but is to
be expected if—as we have argued—what we call utilitarianism
actually is grounded in two relatively distinct psychological con-
structs.
Environmental protection. The relationship between utilitar-
ianism and attitudes toward the environment is complex. On the
one hand, from a utilitarian perspective natural things such as
rivers and rainforests are of only instrumental value, insofar as
they bear on the utility of sentient beings. On the other hand,
because climate change will likely cause severe harm to humans
and other animals, there are strong utilitarian reasons to protect the
environment now to prevent that future suffering. We were there-
fore interested in the relationship between proto-utilitarian tenden-
cies and support for environmental protection. Such support re-
flects utilitarianism’s positive dimension given that relevant
policies require significant self-sacrifice and that most of their
beneficiaries will be physically and temporally distant people
(indeed, people who will exist only in the future). We thus pre-
dicted a positive relation between support for environmental pro-
tection and scores on the OUS-IB by contrast, there is no reason to
expect such a relation with instrumental harm.
Participants were asked how much they agreed or disagreed that
“It is important to protect the environment and the world’s re-
sources because of the negative consequences on future humans if
we don’t” (1 ! strongly disagree, 7 ! strongly agree). Results
showed that there was no overall relationship between OUS scores
and support for environmental protection based on utilitarian con-
siderations, r ! .03, p ! .67, but this was attributable to the two
subscales being significantly associated in different directions. As
predicted, increased impartial beneficence was associated with
greater endorsement of environmental protection, r ! .14, p ! .02,
whereas instrumental harm was associated with less willingness to
protect the environment, r ! $.21, p " .001; these associations
were significantly different (Z ! 4.55, p " .001). Although in-
strumental harm measures willingness to harm people for the sake
of the greater good, it is likely—as suggested by its association
with psychopathy—that it also measures general indifference to
harm and destruction, including harm to the environment.
Ideology.
Religiosity. How would scores on the OUS relate to religious
belief? Religious moral systems often emphasize the importance of
rule-based moral decision making. Delve into the holy books of
almost all major religions and you will find an extravagant number
of rules dictating actions that are either morally obligatory (e.g.,
observing the Sabbath), or morally impermissible (e.g., coveting
thy neighbor’s wife). Such actions are typically seen as morally
required or forbidden by virtue of being what they are, rather than
as a result of their consequences—God commands it, and so it
must be. It is thus not surprising that utilitarianism as a historical
movement often came into direct conflict with religious views
(Mill, 1863), nor that the utilitarian approach to morality is widely
denounced by religious thinkers (Anscombe, 1981; John Paul II,
1995).
In line with the historical relationship between religion and
utilitarianism, psychological research has reported that religious
individuals are more likely to endorse a nonutilitarian approach to
morality (Piazza, 2012; Piazza & Sousa, 2014; Szekely, Opre, &
Miu, 2015) and that religious individuals show a tendency to prefer
rule-based (deontological) over outcome-based (consequentialist)
explanations for the wrongness of a moral action (Piazza, 2012).
However the exact nature of the relationship between religious
belief and utilitarianism might be less straightforward once we
recognize that utilitarianism has both negative (instrumental harm)
and positive (impartial beneficence) dimensions. The two-factor
OUS therefore makes it possible to investigate the relation be-
tween utilitarianism and religious belief in a more fine-grained
way than was possible before.
We measured religiosity with a 5-item Centrality of Religiosity
Scale (CRS; Huber & Huber, 2012). The CRS is a measure of the
centrality, importance, and salience of religiousness in a person,
and consists of five items each tapping one of the theoretically
defined core dimensions of religiosity: public practice, indepen-
dent practice, religious experience, ideology, and intellect. Partic-
ipants were asked to rate on a 5-item scale “How often do you
think about religious issues?” (Intellect: 1 ! never; 5 ! very
often); “To what extent do you believe that God or something
divine exists?” (Ideology: 1 ! not at all, 5 ! very much so); “How
often do you take part in religious services?” (Public practice: 1 !
never, 5 ! very often); “How often do you pray?” (Independent
practice: 1 ! never, 5 ! very often); and “How often do you
experience situations in which you have the feeling that God or
something divine intervenes in your life?” (Experience: 1 ! never,
5 ! very often). Scores were combined into a single reliable
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measure (% ! .93) of the centrality of religiousness for each
participant.
Overall OUS scores were associated with religiosity, r ! .15,
p ! .01, which is perhaps surprising given that previous work has
associated deontological thinking with religiosity (Piazza & Sousa,
2014; Szekely et al., 2015). But a positive relation between reli-
giosity and impartial beneficence, that is, the tendency to endorse
the impartial promotion of everyone’s welfare even at personal
sacrifice to oneself, would be less surprising. Religious systems
often include injunctions to “love thy neighbor”—even those from
other communities, as exemplified in the parable of the Good
Samaritan. Christians are told to “turn the other cheek” and “take
up the cross” such that they humble themselves before God and
forego material or social benefits in lieu of the divinely ordained
moral good. Upon his appointment, Pope Francis said that “It hurts
me when I see a priest or a nun with the latest model car; you can’t
do this . . . please, choose a more humble one. If you like the fancy
one, just think about how many children are dying of hunger in the
world” (Francis, 2013). Peter Singer has said almost identical
things. Overall, the focus on self-sacrifice and love for one’s
neighbors, combined with the idea that all are equal under God’s
eyes, might suggest that scores on the OUS-IB would actually be
positively associated with religiosity. Indeed, this was what we
found, r ! .15, p ! .01: those people who were more religious
were also those who showed a greater endorsement of the impartial
maximization of the greater good. The overall correlation between
OUS scores and religiosity thus was driven by the OUS-IB and
there was no relationship with religiosity and scores on the OUS-
IH, r ! $.06, p ! .31; again these were significantly different
(Z ! 2.70, p ! .01). This pattern of results suggests that the
negative relationship observed between utilitarian thinking and
religiosity in previous research may be restricted to the component
of utilitarianism that rejects traditional deontological moralities,
rather than any reduced concern for impartially maximizing wel-
fare per se. Indeed, this contention is supported by a separate
analysis with the 6-item Anti-Traditional Morality measure that
was not included in the final scale (see above discussion). As
would be expected, there was a strong negative relationship such
that people who were more religious were less willing to break
with the rules of traditional deontological moralities, r ! $.48,
p " .001. Given that for our American participants traditional
moralities are based heavily in the Judeo-Christian tradition, this
result is to be expected.
The positive relationship between religiosity and utilitarianism
is not surprising when one considers the dissociation of impartial
beneficence and instrumental harm in our 2D model. When Pope
John Paul II criticized utilitarianism for treating people as means to
an end, he primarily took issue with the instrumental harm aspect
of the theory, and indeed it is this focus on instrumental harm that
seems to have driven the negative relationship between religiosity
and utilitarianism seen among laypeople in previous work. But the
positive correlation of religiosity and impartial beneficence is
easier to make sense of, reflected in the pronouncements of Pope
Francis on the importance of sacrificing material goods for oneself
to help those in foreign countries.
Indeed, from a historical perspective, the relationship between
utilitarianism and the Judeo-Christian tradition is complex: al-
though utilitarianism has often been historically in conflict with
religious belief, some of the direct intellectual precursors of util-
itarianism, such William Paley, were Christian believers (Schnee-
wind, 1977); and the self-sacrificing impartial beneficence at the
core of utilitarianism has been claimed to have its roots in Chris-
tian ideas (Gray, 2015). Sure enough, standard accounts of Chris-
tian ethics do generally involve a radical demand for self-sacrifice,
impartiality, and universal love. It is really the willingness to harm
and the rejection of traditional moral rules that lie at the heart of
the historical tension between utilitarianism and religion, and
Christian thinkers have recently begun exploring various affinities
between the two views (Camosy, 2012).
Political ideology. In addition to associating deontological
moral thinking with religiosity, some work has suggested that
political conservatism exerts a significant effect on deontological
moral reasoning—independent of religiosity (Piazza & Sousa,
2014). For this reason, we measured both economic and social
political ideology (1 ! very liberal/left, 7 ! very conservative/
right), as well as asked participants to indicate which political
party (if any) they identified with.
Overall OUS scores were not associated with either self-
reported economic, r ! .02, p ! .69 or social conservatism, r !
.06, p ! .28. But, again, more nuanced results were observed when
looking at the subscales independently. Economic conservatism
was significantly associated with reduced impartial beneficence,
r ! $.12, p ! .054 but increased acceptance of instrumental
harm, r ! .18, p ! .02, with these relationships being significantly
different (Z ! $3.88, p " .001). Such results mesh well with
previous work showing an association between libertarianism and
prosacrifice judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (Iyer et al., 2012).
Social conservatism was not associated with scores on the OUS-
IB, r ! $.06, p ! .34, but, as with economic issues, greater social
conservatism was associated with increased endorsement of instru-
mental harm, r ! .18, p ! .003, and again these associations were
significantly different (Z ! $3.09, p ! .002).
A similar pattern of results was seen when looking at political
party identification. There was no difference between Republicans
and Democrats on overall OUS scores, t(194) ! $0.35, p ! .73,
but again, this was because party identification was associated with
the two subscales in opposite ways. There was a significant dif-
ference on OUS-IB scores as a function of political party,
t(194) ! $2.38, p ! .02, whereby Democrats reported greater
impartial beneficence (M ! 3.77, SD ! 1.22) than Republicans
(M ! 3.32, SD ! 1.22). Similarly, there was a significant differ-
ence on OUS-IH scores as a function of political party, t(194) !
2.34, p ! .02, but this was such that Republicans reported greater
endorsement of instrumental harm (M ! 3.70, SD ! 1.21) than
Democrats (M ! 3.25, SD ! 1.26). In sum, Democrats were more
likely to endorse impartial beneficence, and Republicans more
likely to endorse instrumental harm. The distinct subcomponents
of proto-utilitarian thinking, then, have distinct psychological cor-
relates and even appear to be differently distributed in different
groups of people.
Demographics. Finally, we looked at the relationship be-
tween OUS scores and demographic measures of age, education
level, and gender. There was no relationship between age and
OUS scores: not overall, r ! $.06, p ! .30, for the OUS-IB,
r ! $.08, p ! .19, or for the OUS-IH, r ! $.01, p ! .89.
Similarly, there was no relationship between education level
and OUS scores: not overall, r ! $.05, p ! .40, for the
OUS-IB, r ! $.04, p ! .56, or for the OUS-IH, r ! $.04, p !
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.47. There were no gender differences in OUS scores overall,
t(279) ! .04, p ! .97, nor for the OUS-IB, t(279) ! $1.40, p !
.16. While the effect of gender on OUS-IH scores was not
significant by conventional standards (see Lakens et al., 2017),
t(279) ! 1.79, p ! .07, the mean difference was consistent with
previous research such that men showed a slightly greater
tendency to endorse instrumental harm (M ! 3.48, SD ! 1.33)
than women (M ! 3.21, SD ! 1.13).
General Discussion
Utilitarianism tells us to impartially maximize the aggregate
well-being of everyone—and that we must severely harm or even
kill innocent people if doing so is needed to achieve this overar-
ching moral ideal. Most psychological research on utilitarian
decision-making has so far focused on this last, negative dimen-
sion of utilitarianism, largely ignoring the more foundational im-
partial ideal that underlies it. In this paper, we have introduced a
new theoretical framework for thinking about proto-utilitarian
moral thinking in the lay population. Using this framework, we
have developed, refined, and validated a new approach to measur-
ing such thinking that taps both positive and negative dimensions
of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay population. The Oxford
Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) is designed to address the limitations
of prior measures, especially the currently standard method of
measuring so-called ‘utilitarian’ judgments with sacrificial dilem-
mas. In creating the scale, we took care to ensure that it was
conceptually accurate without inappropriately imposing abstract
philosophical notions on the moral thinking of nonphilosophers.
Thus, although the pool of items we initially considered was based
on a thorough analysis of the relevant literature in ethics and vetted
by leading professional moral philosophers, the final scale is
empirically driven and reflects clusters of moral evaluations that
were statistically robust in large samples taken from the lay pop-
ulation. Most importantly, our findings show that proto-utilitarian
tendencies do not form a unitary psychological phenomenon in the
lay population, and in fact consist of two largely independent
subcomponents. This division explains otherwise puzzling results
in the existing literature, sheds new light on the psychological
sources both of utilitarianism and widespread opposition to it, and
opens up new directions for future research.
The 2D Model of Utilitarian Decision-Making
One of the central ways in which the OUS departs from previous
work is by not assuming that utilitarian moral tendencies form a
unitary psychological phenomenon, let alone one that can be
understood by studying responses in a highly specific moral con-
text. According to our 2D model, utilitarian decision-making in-
volves two dissociable and independently important aspects, mea-
sured by separate subscales in the OUS: the first, Impartial
Beneficence, reflects the extent to which individuals endorse the
impartial promotion of everyone’s welfare, while the second,
Instrumental Harm, reflects the extent to which people endorse
harm that brings about a greater good. By dissociating these two
independent factors of utilitarianism, it is possible to reach a more
nuanced and accurate picture of how utilitarian tendencies are
related to a host of individual difference measures and other moral
attitudes.
The initial results reported here already show how the 2D model
of utilitarian decision-making allows us to make better sense of
prior findings and associations that would otherwise seem puz-
zling. They also show how the model can be used to shed light on
the psychological sources of the core ‘positive’ aspect of utilitar-
ianism, its radically impartial character and the demands on the
self that it consequently imposes. For example, multiple prior
studies claimed to find that the moral-decision making of psycho-
paths is abnormally utilitarian (see, e.g., Koenigs et al., 2012)—a
surprising result given the antisocial character of this condition.
But once we take into account the distinction between instrumental
harm and impartial beneficence as separate dimensions of utilitar-
ian thinking, this result can easily be explained. As reported above,
psychopathy in a nonclinical sample was associated with greater
endorsement of instrumental harm but not impartial beneficence, a
far less surprising result. In a prior study we similarly found a
positive relation between psychopathic tendencies and prosacrifi-
cial judgments in sacrificial dilemmas but not with the ‘greater
good’ dilemmas that pit impartial versus partial moral concerns
(Kahane et al., 2015), a finding replicated here.
The 2D model also allows us to better clarify the relationship
between utilitarian moral thinking and empathic concern. Again,
the negative relationship between utilitarian decision-making and
empathic concern suggested by multiple prior studies (Choe &
Min, 2011; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Gleichgerrcht & Young,
2013; Patil & Silani, 2014) is highly puzzling given the historical
and, on some views, strong theoretical tie between classical utili-
tarianism and empathy (Hare, 1981; Smart, 1961/1973) and evi-
dence tying empathic concern to extreme altruism to distant
strangers (Brethel-Haurwitz et al., 2016). But our results show that
this association is driven exclusively by the instrumental harm
dimension of utilitarianism and that empathic concern is at the
same time positively associated with impartial beneficence, utili-
tarianism’s positive core. Indeed, our results show that these two
dimensions of utilitarianism are not only independent but are also
inversely correlated with a psychological trait that is highly rele-
vant for morality, further confirming our view that it is a mistake
to treat utilitarian decision-making as a unitary psychological
phenomenon outside of the philosophical context.
In line with interpretation, we also found that while impartial
beneficence was associated with greater donation rates to a hypo-
thetical charity helping people in impoverished countries, greater
support for welfare-based concern about the environment, and
higher levels of identification with the whole of humanity, these
measures were either not, or in the case of environmental concern,
negatively, associated with instrumental harm.
The 2D model similarly sheds new light on the relation between
utilitarian moral thinking and religiosity. Although the two have
often been historically opposed, our results suggest that the core of
that conflict may lie in utilitarianism’s endorsement of instrumen-
tal harm, as well as in its rejection of traditional and absolutist
moral rules. Yet religiosity was positively correlated with impartial
beneficence, reflecting the important affinities between utilitarian-
ism and Judeo-Christian moral ideals, affinities being explored in
some recent work in ethics (Camosy, 2012).
Utilitarianism is typically viewed as a radically progressive
moral view. But as the association between impartial beneficence
and religiosity reveals, the relationship between utilitarianism and
religious and political commitments might be a bit more compli-
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cated. This notion is further confirmed by the nuanced relationship
between the OUS subscales and political ideologies. For example,
economic conservatism was at once positively associated with
instrumental harm and, perhaps unsurprisingly, negatively corre-
lated with impartial Beneficence. This finding is in line with
previous studies tying libertarianism to prosacrifice judgments in
sacrificial dilemmas (Iyer et al., 2012), again illustrating the point
that a permissive attitude to harming others is compatible with
having a radically partial and even self-centered view of morality
(Kahane, 2015). Political party affiliation was also associated with
different dimensions of utilitarianism, with Democrats scoring
higher on impartial beneficence and Republicans higher on instru-
mental harm.
Given that the OUS-IB and OUS-IH subscales measure inde-
pendent psychological factors that are differentially or even in-
versely associated with a range of traits and measures, it may be
questioned whether these two dimensions belong in a single scale.
However, the psychological disunity of aspects of utilitarian
decision-making in the lay population does not undermine the
theoretical unity of the overall construct. The items on this scale
were derived from an extensive review of the ethical literature and
vetted by a panel of moral philosophers, and scores on both of the
subscales were associated with endorsement of an explicit state-
ment of utilitarianism. The two subscales were also strongly cor-
related in a sample of expert moral philosophers, further confirm-
ing their theoretical unity. Finally, ordinary individuals who score
highly on both subscales would be appropriately classified as
highly utilitarian—and would rank as considerably more utilitarian
than someone who merely has a permissive attitude to instrumental
harm.
Nevertheless, it is true that focusing on the overall OUS score
risks overlooking or even distorting the relationship between util-
itarian tendencies and various psychological phenomena. At this
early stage, therefore, we suggest that primacy should be given to
the subscale scores. Such an approach is not uncommon with
measures that target conceptually related but psychologically dis-
tinct constructs. A prominent example is the Interpersonal Reac-
tivity Index (Davies, 1980), a multidimensional measure of trait
empathy that consists of four independent subscales, each measur-
ing a theoretically related but psychologically distinct trait.
Instrumental Harm: Implications for the Sacrificial
Dilemmas Approach
The sacrificial dilemmas method is currently the dominant ap-
proach to measuring utilitarian tendencies (Christensen & Gomila,
2012) and it has yielded important, groundbreaking advances for
our understanding of how people consider instrumental harm in
moral decision making (Greene, 2014). At the same time, our
studies support the argument that sacrificial dilemmas only tap a
narrow dimension of utilitarian thinking and that it is unwarranted
to infer general claims about the psychological processes under-
lying utilitarian decision-making only on the basis of the study of
prosacrifice judgments in such dilemmas (Kahane et al., 2015;
Kahane & Shackel, 2010; Kahane, 2015). Our present work con-
firms the hypothesis that instrumental harm is a significant dimen-
sion of proto-utilitarian tendencies in ordinary people, albeit one
that is dissociable from the more positive dimension of impartial
beneficence.8
The OUS is a measure of individual differences in utilitarian
tendencies rather than a tool for directly studying the psycholog-
ical processes (such as aversion to causing harm) involved in
specific episodes of moral decision-making. While much work by
Greene and colleagues has focused on how sacrificial dilemmas
illuminate the cognitive architecture of moral decision-making
rather than utilitarian tendencies per se, sacrificial dilemmas are
often used to measure individual differences in utilitarian tenden-
cies within a population as well as differences in such tendencies
between populations (see, e.g., Bègue & Laine, 2017; Koenigs et
al., 2007). We propose that the OUS should supersede sacrificial
dilemmas as a method for measuring such individual differences,
even in the domain of instrumental harm. Besides its brevity, the
Instrumental Harm subscale of the OUS covers a broader range of
considerations relating to instrumental harm than those captured
by sacrificial dilemmas, and also avoids the far-fetched and often
fantastic character of many sacrificial dilemmas (Bauman et al.,
2014).
At the same time, sacrificial dilemmas remain an important tool
for studying the psychological processes underlying support for
instrumental harm in moral decision-making, one aspect of utili-
tarian decision-making. Notice, however, that while the OUS was
designed to measure the moral outlooks of individuals rather than
the processes underlying moral judgments, it can also shed light on
the considerations that shape moral judgments in more specific
contexts. Indeed the OUS could be used to distinguish those
prosacrifice judgments that reflect only greater acceptance of in-
strumental harm and those that may also reflect a broader impartial
moral perspective; the findings reported here suggest that there
may be such a subset of prosacrifice responses to sacrificial
dilemmas given that such responses were associated with impartial
beneficence (albeit weakly).
All of that said, we believe that there is a strong case for
abandoning the widespread but unhelpful terminological practice
of classifying prosacrifice responses in sacrificial dilemmas as
‘utilitarian judgments’ (Kahane, 2015; Kahane et al., 2015). On
that terminology, a psychopath who is concerned only about his
self-interest and has no compunction about harming others would
be described as having a ‘strong utilitarian bias’ while an extreme
altruist who is a moral vegetarian, gives most of her money to
charities helping people in the developing world, and who donated
her kidney to a stranger, yet who recoils from the idea of violently
sacrificing an innocent person to save five others, would count as
having a ‘strong deontological bias.’ By contrast, the OUS would
reveal that these two individuals are unusually high on one aspect
of a utilitarian outlook but low on the other. Neither is usefully
described as fully utilitarian, although it could be argued that the
extreme altruist comes much closer.
While prosacrifice judgments are in line with utilitarianism, so
are many other moral judgments, including, most paradigmati-
cally, judgments relating to self-sacrifice and aid to strangers—
what we call the positive dimension of utilitarianism. Reserving
the term ‘utilitarian judgment’ to the narrow, negative aspect of a
8 Instrumental Harm was also independent from other aspects of the
‘negative’ dimension of utilitarianism, such as the rejection of absolutist
and traditional morality captured by the third factor that emerged in the
scale construction process, a factor that we ultimately did not include in the
final scale.
26 KAHANE ET AL.
utilitarian outlooks leaves us with no terminology to describe these
other classes of judgments, and gives the misleading impression
that instrumental harm is the core or even the whole of utilitari-
anism. When researchers discuss the psychological factors and
processes that underlie ‘utilitarian judgments’ they can give the
impression that they are referring to a general, unitary psycholog-
ical phenomenon. Yet there is little or no evidence that the pro-
cesses that drive prosacrifice judgments (reflecting greater en-
dorsement of instrumental harm) also drive, for example,
judgments instructing us to give a substantial portion of our
income to help distant strangers. In fact, the findings of the present
study and of Kahane et al. (2015) strongly suggest that very
different processes shape these different kinds of proto-utilitarian
judgments, and that some factors—most notably, empathic con-
cern—may play a different and even contrasting role in each case.
Theoretical clarity and precision would be better served, for
example, if instead of describing the prosacrificial tendencies of
individuals with antisocial traits as a ‘utilitarian bias,’ it was
instead referred to as a ‘consequentialist bias’ (since consequen-
tialism need not imply the positive, impartial aspect of utilitarian-
ism), or even more precisely as a bias in favor of instrumental
harm. Importantly, on our framework such individuals are more
utilitarian than others in one important respect, even if not in
others. Even if a bias in favor of prosacrificial judgments is
strongly driven by reduced aversion to harm, its overt manifesta-
tion seems to be genuinely focused on what we called Instrumental
Harm—that is, seeing harm as permitted only when it leads to a
morally better consequence. This interpretation would be defeated
only if such individuals had a morally permissive attitude toward
harming irrespective of consequence. Yet this seems unlikely, at
least in most individuals whose antisocial tendencies are subclin-
ical.
Impartial Beneficence: Preliminary Findings and
Future Directions
Although the psychology of instrumental harm has received a
great deal of attention in moral psychology, less work has been
devoted to investigating the sources of radically impartial moral
views. There is of course a considerable literature studying altru-
ism (e.g., Batson, 1991; de Waal, 2008; Krebs, 1982) and chari-
table giving more specifically (e.g., Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011;
Caviola, Faulmüller, Everett, Savulescu, & Kahane, 2014; Har-
baugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007; Oppenheimer & Olivola, 2011;
Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, & Vugt, 2007), but as discussed
earlier, impartial beneficence goes beyond a willingness to make
sacrifices to help others, or even a willingness to make sacrifices
to help complete strangers who will not reciprocate (as studied,
e.g., using the Dictator Game; see, e.g., Benenson, Pascoe, &
Radmore, 2007; Brañas-Garza, 2006; Eckel & Grossman, 1996;
Engel, 2011; Everett, Haque, & Rand, 2016). Individuals differ in
the degree to which they are disposed to make sacrifices to help
strangers, but such differences are compatible with commonsense
morality since it regards such sacrifices as permissible and even
praiseworthy. Impartial beneficence, by contrast, is the far more
radical view that we should treat the well-being of all sentient
beings equally—and that we are therefore required to give as
much moral weight to distant strangers as to our closest relatives.
Although such impartial beneficence is theoretically distinct from
identification with the whole of humanity (McFarland et al., 2012),
a construct more concerned with an individual’s sense of identity,
the two constructs are obviously closely related and as expected
were strongly correlated in our research.9
Impartial beneficence was also associated with greater levels of
empathic concern, suggesting an important role for emotion in the
core positive dimension of utilitarianism. This finding is in line
with the theorizing of some prominent utilitarians (Hare, 1981;
Smart & Williams, 1973), but in tension both with accounts of
impartial beneficence that see it as based in cold reason (de
Lazari-Radek & Singer, 2012; Sidgwick, 1901) and some recent
psychological theorizing (Greene, 2008). The link with empathic
concern is also consonant with work suggesting that the psycho-
logical and neural profile of extreme altruists is the reverse of that
of psychopaths (Marsh et al., 2014). To the extent that extreme
altruism is driven by unusual levels of empathic concern (Brethel-
Haurwitz et al., 2016), the 2D model predicts that such extreme
altruists would be high in impartial beneficence but low on instru-
mental harm. And although we did not find a negative association
between psychopathy and impartial beneficence in the lay popu-
lation, we have previously found that psychopathy was linked to
reduced endorsement of self-sacrifice for the greater good in the
‘greater good’ vignettes (Kahane et al., 2015).
While impartial beneficence is not identical with self-sacrifice,
even in its extreme forms, it is still the case that 3 of the 5 items
in the OUS-IB focus on self-sacrifice. Further research is needed
to clarify the relationship between endorsement of self-sacrifice
and refusal to give priority to those who are emotionally, socially,
spatially, and temporally near—two aspects of impartiality that are
potentially distinct. More generally, just as work using sacrificial
dilemmas has revealed a highly complex picture of the multiple
factors that can shape judgments relating to instrumental harm, it
is likely that a wide range of factors can affect judgments relating
to impartial beneficence. The ‘greater good’ vignettes introduced
in Kahane et al. (2015), which cover different aspects of partiality/
impartiality, could be used to study such factors.
The association between impartial beneficence and empathic
concern may seem inconsistent with recent criticisms of empathy
that contrast it with a more impartial, consequentialist approach
(Bloom, 2017). However, that criticism targets empathy under-
stood as feeling what you believe others feel, and as contrasted
with compassion or concern for the well-being of others (Jordan,
Amir, & Bloom, 2016): it is largely the latter which is measured by
the empathic concern subscale employed in the present study
(Davies, 1980). Still, further research into the relationship between
empathic concern and different aspects of moral impartiality is
needed. Moreover, it should not be assumed that an attitude of
impartial beneficence will be automatically translated into focused
efforts to maximize utility of the kind advocated by the effective
altruist movement (MacAskill, 2015; Singer, 2015). It may be that
a tendency toward impartial beneficence makes up the affective
9 Fully, impartial beneficence regards the well-being of all morally
relevant subjects as equally important. Exactly which beings fall within the
scope of such concern will depend on further questions about well-being,
the relationship between well-being and sentience, and which living things
possess sentience in the relevant sense (a utilitarian may give equal
consideration to the well-being of all sentient beings but hold that, e.g., fish
are not sentient in the relevant sense).
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background to such an explicit maximizing aim, but that further
cognitive steps are needed to endorse it explicitly.
Recent work in moral psychology and its evolutionary origins
has highlighted the ‘groupish’ character of human morality
(Greene, 2014; Haidt, 2012) and the ways in which altruism is
often constrained by self-interest (e.g., Bardsley, 2008; Dana,
Cain, & Dawes, 2006; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000) and social
distance (Jones & Rachlin, 2006). Commonsense morality allows
individuals to prioritize self over others, family and friends over
strangers, and country and other ingroups over outgroup members.
The British Prime Minister Theresa May recently stated that “If
you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of
nowhere.” Further familiar injunctions include “Family comes
first” and “Charity begins at home.” The impartial cosmopolitan
outlook of utilitarianism is a radical departure from such common-
sense attitudes. But although the factors that underlie allegiance to
various ingroups have been studied extensively, the psychological
underpinnings of such an impartial moral view have received less
attention.
Interestingly, recent work has found that participants expressed
negative attitudes toward actors who sacrificed one to save a larger
number in sacrificial dilemmas (Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett,
2016) as well as toward actors who acted impartially by not giving
priority to those with whom they have close personal relationships
(Hughes, 2017). It is not surprising that both aspects of utilitari-
anism are regarded with suspicion—the utilitarian ideal of impar-
tial beneficence was already ridiculed by Charles Dickens in Bleak
House in his character of Mrs. Jellyby, a ‘telescopic philanthropist’
who is obsessed with aiding a remote African tribe while showing
little concern for her own family (Dickens, 1853). At the same
time, such an impartial attitude is unlikely to arouse the aversive
reaction most people feel toward the idea of violently sacrificing
an innocent person—let alone toward the idea of infanticide.
Moreover, Hughes (2017) found that impartial acts were regarded
as less moral than partial ones because of inferences about lack of
empathy and compassion; yet we found that impartial beneficence
is closely tied to empathic concern. In addition, Hughes (2017)
focused on cases where actors do not give priority to those close to
them. Attitudes toward actors who engage in acts of extreme
self-sacrifice are likely to be more ambivalent, and may be influ-
enced by whether such acts are regarded by the actor as super-
erogatory (i.e., going beyond the call of duty) or, in line with
utilitarianism, as obligatory—and thus as issuing a similar demand
to others.
The evidence currently suggests that the variance in moral views
about instrumental harm is strongly driven by differences in aver-
sion to harming. Individuals who feel a strong aversion to harming
tend to reject Instrumental Harm; those with less or no such
aversion regard it more permissively. There is at present less
evidence about the sources of differences in impartial beneficence.
It is very likely that low OUS-IB scores, indicating strong partial-
ity, reflect either a strongly self-centered outlook and reluctance to
make significant sacrifices to others, or a strong commitment to
various narrow ingroups of the kind measured, for example, by the
loyalty subscaled of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Gra-
ham et al., 2011). But although factors driving such strongly partial
views are well-studied, the factors that drive above-average im-
partial views, all the way to the radical impartiality of utilitarian-
ism, are not as well understood. For example, whereas within a
utilitarian framework there is no inherent difference between the
rejection of partiality to self and a rejecting of partiality to close
others, these two aspects of radical impartiality may have distinct
psychological sources in the lay population.
Because the present study only investigated the correlates of
impartial beneficence, it cannot speak directly to the question of
what causally drives it. The tie we found between impartial be-
neficence and empathic concern, and the absence of an association
with need for cognition, is in line with the notion that such radical
impartiality is driven by empathic concern, an affective disposi-
tion, broadly in line with some philosophical accounts of the
sources of utilitarianism (Hare, 1981; Smart, 1961/1973) but less
so with the view that such impartiality is based on rational reflec-
tion on the arbitrariness of privileging some humans over others or
of giving moral significance to mere distance (Sidgwick, 1907; de
Lazari-Radek & Singer, 2012). However, further work is needed to
directly investigate this question.
Although impartial beneficence and instrumental harm are two
independent dimensions of moral judgment, they can interact in
important ways. Views on impartial beneficence determine which
beings are taken to fall within the scope of morality and the extent
to which they are given moral weight. These considerations will in
turn affect judgments about whether certain people (who may be
family members, compatriots, or strangers) should be sacrificed to
save others (who again may be close or distant from the agent; see
Petrinovich et al., 1993; Swann et al., 2010). Conversely, views on
instrumental harm will affect how one will approach promoting the
greater good: are we permitted to promote this impartial aim by
engaging in cold calculation of cost and benefit, sacrificing some
to help a greater number, or must our efforts to help others also
respect the rights of individuals? This two-way relationship be-
tween the two factors offers further justification to measuring both
of them in a single scale.
The Psychological Sources of Utilitarianism and
Anti-Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is often portrayed by its proponents as the product
of clear-headed rational reflection, and resistance to utilitarianism
as largely due to the way it clashes with powerful intuitions and
emotions (such as those elicited by the idea of violently sacrificing
an innocent person to maximize utility; Singer, 1974, 2005).
Greene (2008) has argued that rather than deontology and conse-
quentialism being “philosophical inventions,” they are better un-
derstood as “philosophical manifestations of two dissociable psy-
chological patterns, two different ways of moral thinking, that
have been part of the human repertoire for thousands of years” (p.
360). We concur that support for utilitarian (consequentialist) or
deontological ethical principles is almost certainly driven by psy-
chological dispositions and processes that are part of our basic
mental toolkit. Where we disagree is with the notion that the
utilitarian side of the equation is the result of a single, unitary
psychological pattern. This is because our findings suggest that
there are two dissociable psychological sources within the utilitar-
ian dimension: one relating to impartial beneficence and one to
instrumental harm. In other words, our 2D model posits that there
are two dissociable components to utilitarian decision-making—
something quite different from Greene’s dual process model,
which posits two systems underlying deontology versus utilitari-
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anism, while treating each as a unitary psychological construct. On
Greene’s model, that is, the ‘dual’ refers to automatic versus
controlled processes underlying deontological versus utilitarian
judgments respectively; in our model, the ‘two’ refers to two
different components within utilitarianism.
While a unitary model of utilitarianism-as-cognitive (and
deontology-as-emotional) seemed to be supported by earlier stud-
ies using sacrificial dilemmas that tied prosacrifice judgments to
effortful deliberation (Greene et al., 2004), more recent work has
related such judgments to reduced aversion to harming (Cushman,
Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012; Kahane et al., 2015). This latter
work suggests therefore that prosacrifice judgments are largely
driven by reduced emotion. In line with this interpretation, in the
present study we found an association between the Instrumental
Harm subscale and psychopathy and reduced empathic concern.
The positive dimension of utilitarianism has also often been
claimed to be based in rational reflection (de Lazari-Radek &
Singer, 2012; Sidgwick, 1907)—Peter Singer’s (1972) famous
argument that there is no moral difference between letting a
drowning child die and refusing to donate money to prevent deaths
in developing countries is based on an appeal to consistency, not
on pulling at our heartstrings. As we saw, however, the present
study also associates impartial beneficence with empathic concern,
an affective disposition—indeed, one that is exactly the reverse of
that associated with instrumental harm. At the same time, neither
subscale was significantly associated with need for cognition, a
trait measure of motivation to engage in effortful cognition. These
results are consonant with recent studies that found that extreme
altruists who donated their kidneys to strangers exhibit higher
empathic concern (Brethel-Haurwitz et al., 2016).
Importantly, our 2D model suggests a hitherto overlooked
source of opposition to utilitarianism. Utilitarianism notoriously
has implications that many find highly counterintuitive and even
repugnant. Individuals low in both instrumental harm and impartial
beneficence are likely to be strongly resistant to utilitarianism.
However, the psychological independence and degree of tension
between these two dimensions of utilitarianism suggests a further
obstacle to its acceptance: psychological factors such as empathic
concern that may make some individuals receptive to one dimen-
sion may also make them resistant to the other. There might be a
degree of psychological instability internal to utilitarianism. As
noted above, however, further research is required to clarify the
causal relationship between empathic concern and impartial be-
neficence.
Instrumental harm and impartial beneficence are two aspects of
a single coherent philosophical theory, but they come apart in the
psychology of ordinary people. It is striking that while the two
were only weakly associated in the lay population, they were
strongly correlated in a sample of expert moral philosophers. It is
unclear what explains this sharp contrast, and at this stage we can
only speculate about its source. One natural explanation would be
that this change may be due to philosophical education, including
exposure to explicit views and arguments that tie the two moral
dimensions together. On the 2D model, individuals are likely to
arrive at such an overall utilitarian view by following two distinct
psychological paths. Some individuals—perhaps driven by unusu-
ally high levels of empathic concern—begin by endorsing a rad-
ically impartial vision of moral concern and, in an attempt to turn
this endorsement into a coherent theory, eventually come to en-
dorse forms of instrumental harm as well, to promote such impar-
tial goals. Other individuals may start with greater acceptance of
instrumental harm—likely driven by low levels of empathic con-
cern—and a general rejection of traditional moral rules, and,
seeking to find a systematic moral framework to replace the
commonsense morality that they reject, come to endorse a sweep-
ing impartial view. In both cases, reasoning may serve not as the
impetus to the embryonic utilitarian view, but rather as a means to
integrate two aspects of utilitarianism that are psychologically
independent or even opposed. Utilitarianism may be the product,
not of pure rational reflection and argument, but of an attempt to
bring pretheoretical tendencies and intuitions into a coherent equi-
librium (along the lines suggested, in the deontological context, by
Holyoak & Powell, 2016). Further research could investigate (a)
the extent to which explicit endorsement of utilitarian views in-
volves such adjustment, (b) whether one of the two ‘starting
points’ is predominant, and (c) whether the initially dominant
dimension predicts the degree to which the behavior of utilitarians
mirrors their theoretical commitments. One can predict, for exam-
ple, that individuals who start out high only in instrumental harm
give less money to charity compared with those who start out high
in impartial beneficence.10
An alternative explanation of the association between the two
subscales in the expert sample is that the structure of the debate in
current moral philosophy attracts those individuals in whom the
two dimensions are already aligned. Possible support for this
speculative hypothesis comes from the fact that the proportion of
the lay population that could be described as having strong overall
utilitarian tendencies—around 26% scored above the midpoint of
the OUS ((4) and only 4% scored 5 or more—is not substantially
lower than the self-reported view of philosophers. Of 931 partic-
ipants in a recent survey of professional philosophers, 23.6%
favored or leaned toward consequentialism over deontology or
virtue ethics; of these, only 9.7% endorsed consequentialism out-
right (Bourget & Chalmers, 2014). Because consequentialism in-
cludes both utilitarianism in its different forms as well as theories
that ascribe value to things other than utility (e.g., to justice), these
results suggest that the percentage of professional philosophers
who endorse utilitarianism without qualification may not be much
higher than the percentage of participants in our study who con-
10 Impartial beneficence and instrumental harm are logically linked
within a utilitarian framework: classical utilitarianism tells us that impartial
beneficence is the whole of morality, which entails that there are no
intrinsic constraints on the means we can use to promote everyone’s good.
That is to say, instrumental harm is derived from the more fundamental
idea of impartial beneficence, when the latter is used to define moral
rightness. However, it does not follow that the two must go together as a
matter of logic. We can regard Impartial Beneficence not as the whole of
morality but as one moral principle among others, a principle that can be
outweighed or constrained, for example, by restrictions on what kind of
harms are morally permitted. Conversely, acceptance of instrumental harm
in no way mandates endorsement of impartial beneficence—in the same
way that a permissive attitude to ‘white lies’ in no way commits us to
accepting duties to aid distant strangers (though instrumental harm does
assume a degree of beneficence—i.e., giving some weight to the number of
lives one can save). So the strong association between impartial benefi-
cence and instrumental harm within expert moral philosophers cannot be
fully explained simply as being due to a search for consistency. It may also
reflect the fact that both impartial beneficence and instrumental harm are
historically associated with utilitarianism, a view that features prominently
in introductory courses in ethics.
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sistently endorsed strongly utilitarian views. Coupled with our own
findings, this at least raises the possibility—a possibility that
requires further investigation—that full-blown endorsement of
utilitarianism partly reflects an unusual prephilosophical psycho-
logical disposition in a minority of individuals, rather the end point
of a process of philosophical reasoning from a common psycho-
logical starting point shared by nonutilitarians. A simpler alterna-
tive explanation, however, is that utilitarian views are endorsed
only by a small minority both in moral philosophy and in the
general population because of the general cultural dominance of
deontological forms of morality.
Limitations and Future Directions
The OUS does have a number of limitations. Some of these have
been mentioned in passing in the discussion above but it is worth
making them explicit. First, the OUS is a measure of individual
differences in moral outlook, not of the processes and mechanisms
that underlie a particular episode of moral judgment; it measures
traits rather than states. Second, the items on the OUS-IB largely
focus on self-sacrifice and less on impartiality with respect to
others: a more fine-grained approach may be needed to investigate
different strands of the psychology of moral partiality and impar-
tiality.
A third potential limitation of the OUS is that it doesn’t directly
measure the calculating dimension of utilitarianism. Classical util-
itarians not only claim that we should impartially consider the
good of all in our moral decisions—they also hold that we are
morally required to maximize that good, and it is this calculating
and maximizing aspect of utilitarianism that some find problem-
atic. Many items on both subscales of the OUS implicitly involve
comparisons of overall utility (sacrificing one’s leg to save anoth-
er’s life; killing some innocent people to save a greater number),
and the OUS was positively associated with an explicit statement
of utilitarianism that included this maximizing component. But the
scale admittedly does not directly measure this dimension of
utilitarianism. This is for two reasons. First, to directly measure
such a maximizing tendency, we would need to see whether
subjects would endorse, not only sacrificing 1 to save 5, but 1 to
save 2, and 20 to save 21 (Kahane, 2015). A short item scale is not
the best tool for this achieving this end. Second, it is doubtful
whether such a maximizing tendency is a distinctive moral phe-
nomenon rather than a general decision-making tendency—an
egoist driven by pure self-interest can also engage in elaborate
cost-benefit analysis when others may merely satisfice. We con-
cede, however, that the question of whether such a maximizing
tendency reflects a distinctive dimension of moral decision-
making and, possibly, even a further dimension of proto-utilitarian
tendencies, is worth investigating.11
Finally, we wish to emphasize that the OUS is meant to be a
measure of an overall pattern of moral views and judgments, not
behavior or intentions to act. Individuals may strongly endorse
instrumental harm yet find it difficult to sacrifice someone to save
a greater number if actually confronted with such a decision in real
life. Similarly, someone may endorse a highly impartial vision of
morality yet fail, for example, to donate much money to relevant
effective charities. Indeed, several studies found that the moral
behavior of moral philosophers does not significantly differ from
that of others (Schwitzgebel, 2009; Schwitzgebel & Rust, 2009,
2014). We did find that impartial beneficence was positively
associated with greater rates of hypothetical donation to charity but
further research is needed to clarify the relationship between the
subscales of the OUS and relevant forms of actual moral behavior.
Conclusion
The use of sacrificial dilemmas to study the contrast between
utilitarian and deontological judgments has dominated research in
moral psychology. But although the psychological source of this
major ethical dispute is of great interest, sacrificial dilemmas are a
limited tool for studying proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay
population (Kahane, 2015; Kahane et al., 2015; Kahane &
Shackel, 2010). In this paper we have introduced the 2D model of
utilitarian psychology, a new theoretical framework for studying
such tendencies. The 2D model treats utilitarian moral decision-
making not as an all-or-nothing category but as a matter of degree,
and as involving two largely independent ‘positive’ and ‘negative’
dimensions. On this basis, we developed the OUS, a new scale that
is both philosophically rigorous and empirically driven, and which
attempts to address concerns about sacrificial dilemmas and exist-
ing scales. Our preliminary application of the scale already dem-
onstrates how the distinction between impartial beneficence and
instrumental harm can help to clarify the relationship between a
utilitarian moral outlook and a range of other psychological con-
structs and measures while generating important new avenues for
further research. Importantly, our results strongly suggest that, in
the context of the lay population, utilitarian decision-making does
not constitute a unitary psychological phenomenon.
The division between impartial beneficence and instrumental
harm may also have important practical implications. Ethicists
who wish to promote wider acceptance of utilitarian moral ap-
proaches in the general population may need to divide their efforts.
Those individuals who are more likely to endorse instrumental
harm, or generally be willing to dismiss or discount traditional
moral rules, may at the same time be indifferent—or even hos-
tile—to the overarching moral aim of impartially maximizing the
good of all sentient beings. Conversely, drawing public attention to
the negative side of utilitarianism—one upshot of the widespread
identification of utilitarianism with sacrificial solutions to trolley
dilemmas in current moral psychology—may do little for, and
even get in the way of, promoting greater moral impartiality.
Singer’s session on effective altruism at Victoria University drew
those who were excited by the idea of impartial beneficence—but
also a group of outraged protestors repelled by instrumental harm.
To the extent that the positive aim of utilitarianism has greater
moral priority, utilitarians would be advised to downplay the
negative component of their doctrine and may even find a surpris-
ingly pliant audience in the religious population.
11 Another distinctive feature of classical utilitarianism that the OUS
does not measure directly is its rejection of a moral distinction between acts
and omissions. One of the items of the Impartial Beneficence subscale is
concerned with rejecting such a distinction in the context of aid, but
impartial beneficence is conceptually distinct from the rejection of the
act/omissions distinction and the relationship between the two requires
further investigation. Such an investigation would also clarify the relation
between OUS scores and omission bias, a nonutilitarian disposition that has
been studied extensively (see Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov & Baron, 1990).
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But although such a strategy may be a more effective way of
promoting aspects of utilitarian thinking, the apparent psycholog-
ical disconnect between the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ dimensions
of utilitarianism—an attitude of impartial concern for the well-
being of all individuals, on the one hand, and a ‘cold-hearted,’
unemotional acceptance of instrumental harm on the other—sug-
gests that the prospect of full-blown, unreserved acceptance of
utilitarianism by more than a small minority may face formidable
psychological obstacles.
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